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THE APPLICATION OF COMPULSORY JOINDER,
INTERVENTION, IMPLEADER AND ATTACHMENT TO
LETTER OF CREDIT LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
A letter of credit' is a device by which a bank or other issuer,2 at the
request of its customer, engages 3 that it will honor drafts or other
demands for payment if presented in compliance with specified condi-
tions.4 The essential function of the letter of credit is to substitute the
1. For a general definition of a letter of credit, see Bank of Newport v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1982);
East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 601-02 (5th
Cir. 1979) (quoting 2 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 5.103(a)(1) (Vernon 1968));
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 393-95 (D. Md.
1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Ernesto Foglino & Co. v.
Webster, 217 A.D. 282, 293, 216 N.Y.S. 225, 234 (1926), modified on other grounds,
244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1927); H. Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 26-27
(5th ed. 1974); 6 Michie on Banks and Banking ch. 12, § 28, at 398 (perm. ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Michie]; J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under
the Uniform Commercial Code § 18-2 (2d ed. 1980).
2. An issuer is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-
103(1)(c) (1977). Accordingly, an issuer need not be a bank but also may be a finance
or insurance company, or other similar institution. J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 1, § 18-1, at 710; see Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d
1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1973) (mortgage broker as issuer), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974); U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(b), (c) & official comment 1 (1977).
3. The issuer's engagement that it will honor drafts or other demands for
payment that comply with the terms of the letter of credit is one of the formal
requirements for establishing a valid letter of credit. See U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1977);
Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The other
formal requirements are that the letter of credit be in writing and signed by the
issuer, U.C.C. § 5-104(1) (1977), and that the letter conspicuously state that it is a
letter of credit when no demand or draft is required for payment, id. § 5-102(1)(c).
In addition, the issuer's engagement to honor must be written on the draft itself, see
id. § 3-410(1), and, to be enforceable, must be communicated to the prescribed third
party in such a mnanner "that the commitment may be legally enforced against the
[issuer]." H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 10.
4. There is a split of authority as to whether strict or substantial compliance is
required. The traditional view requires strict compliance with the terms of the letter
of credit. Kozolchyk, Preface to The Law of Letters of Credit and Standbys in the
80's, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 235, 235 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk 1]; State of
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-
Documentary Letters of Credit, Legislative Doe. No. 65(F), at 67 (1955), reprinted
in 3 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Comm'n for
1955, at 1635 [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report]; e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1983); Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1982);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802,
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credit of the issuer for the credit of its customer, 5 often a buyer of
goods (customer).6 As a result, the beneficiary of the credit, typically a
seller of goods (beneficiary) , 7 is assured of payment upon proper
805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American
Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Ariz. 1978); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Some courts,
however, have required only substantial compliance, or some variation thereof. See,
e.g., Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47 n.1
(2d Cir. 1979) (strict compliance limited to "essential requirements of the letter of
credit"); Flagship Cruises v. New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705 (1st
Cir. 1978) (non-compliance "not fatal" absent possibility of misleading paying bank
to its detriment); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d
230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967) (documentary draft is acceptable if it complies "in all
significant respects"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Crocker Commercial Servs.
v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-63 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (reasonable
compliance standard); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 816,
413 N.E.2d 1288, 1299 (1980) (compliance sufficient when presentment does not
"deviate significantly" from the letter's requirements). A third view applies a strict
compliance standard when the beneficiary sues the issuer, but a substantial compli-
ance standard when the issuer seeks reimbursement from its customer. J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 731-32 (quoting State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra, at 67-68, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1634-35); see
Transamerica Deleval, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Far E. Textile Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196
(S.D. Ohio 1977). Compare Bank of Italy v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236 N.Y. 106,
108, 140 N.E. 211, 212 (1923) (action by beneficiary against the issuer) with Bank of
Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N.Y. 482, 494, 17 N.E. 217, 221-22 (1888) (suit by issuer
for reimbursement). See generally Note, Letters of Credit: A Solution to the Problem
of Documentary Compliance, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 848, 856 (1982) (advocating strict
compliance) [hereinafter cited as Documentary Compliance].
5. Continental Nat'l Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802
(4th Cir. 1975); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 27, 44; 6 Michie, supra note 1, ch. 12,
§ 30, at 410; see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173
(3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592
F.2d 550, 552-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); West Va. Hous. Dev.
Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976); National Sur. Corp. v.
Midland Bank & Trust Co., 408 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 551 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1977); Documentary Compliance, supra note 4, at
848 (1982).
6. A customer is defined as "a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to
issue a credit." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977). Other names for this party include
accredited buyer, importer, consignee and account party. H. Harfield, supra note 1,
at 33. A bank that procures the issuance or confirmation of a letter of credit on behalf
of its customer is also considered to be a customer. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977).
7. A beneficiary of a letter of credit is defined as "a person who is entitled under
its terms to draw or demand payment," U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d) (1977), and is usually a
seller of goods, see, e.g., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567
F.2d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 1977); Vazman, S.A. v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 418 F. Supp.
1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecnica Campana,
S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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presentment of the documents required by the terms of the letter of
credit.8 The customer receives evidence of performance of the under-
lying contract from this documentary presentment. 9 The commercial
The beneficiary is not a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the issuer
and its customer because the beneficiary's claims are not subject to all claims that the
issuer, as promisor, might set up against the customer, as promisee. J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 714; see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550
F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977); Restatement of Contracts § 140 (1932); J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 17-8, at 623 (2d ed. 1977). But see West Va. Hous.
Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (characterizing
letter of credit as third-party beneficiary contract) (quoting Harvey Estes Constr. Co.
v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974)); Courtaulds N.
Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.) (same),
rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975). The beneficiary also is not an
assignee of the customer's rights because the beneficiary's exclusive right to draw on
the letter of credit cannot be met with defenses that the issuer might have against the
customer. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 714; see Restatement of
Contracts § 167 (1932). See infra note 109.
8. See East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598,
601 (5th Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571
F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F.
Supp. 386, 394, (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Kingdom of
Swed. v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787-88
(1949); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 18; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-
1, at 705.
9. See Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 319 (Me. 1978);
H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 18. The term document includes "any paper including
document of title, security, invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like,"
U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b) (1977), and is intended by the drafters to be construed broadly,
see id. § 5-103 official comment 2. Honoring a documentary draft or demand for
payment "is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents." Id. §
5-103(1)(b). Documents ordinarily required by the terms of a letter of credit are a
commercial invoice, a bill of lading and an insurance policy in addition to the
beneficiary's draft. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d
461, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1970); Continental Nat'l Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d
312, 314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934); National Am. Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 627 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 57. Collectively, these documents evidence
the beneficiary's performance of the underlying contract. H. Harfield, supra note 1,
at 56-57. The commercial invoice is the beneficiar.y's representation of the merchan-
dise shipped or to be shipped, see Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y.
234, 242, 146 N.E. 347, 349 (1924) (invoices ordinarily contain vendor's version of
the transaction), and must match the description of the goods in the letter of credit.
International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documen-
tary Credits (UCP) art. 41(c) (Publ. No. 400) (rev. ed. 1983) (effective Oct. 1, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.P.]; H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 56-57. The letter of credit
may require no documents other than the beneficiary's draft or demand for payment.
See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598,
601 (5th Cir. 1979); Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 79 (5th
Cir. 1922); Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65,
68 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 710. Nevertheless, the
issuer must pay on the beneficiary's complying presentment even if the goods shipped
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utility of a letter of credit, however, is not limited to facilitating a
mercantile exchange. Rather, the letter of credit can function as a
financing mechanism through assignment or negotiation by the bene-
ficiary 0 and as a "guaranty" to ensure performance in non-goods
transactions."1
do not conform to the specifications of the underlying contract. E.g., Asociacion de
Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.
1970); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 777,
780 (S.D. Iowa 1979). In order to guard against this result, the customer may require
the beneficiary to present a third party's certificate of quality to the issuer, certifying
the quality of the goods shipped. See H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 67-68; see, e.g.,
Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 231 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v.
General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 892, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (1979).
10. The drafters did not intend to limit the application of Article 5 of the U.C.C.
to letter of credit arrangements that facilitate mercantile transactions. See U.C.C. §
5-102 official comment 1 (1977). Accordingly, a beneficiary can finance his perform-
ance of the underlying contract by assigning the entire letter of credit, by assigning
his rights to the letter of credit proceeds, or by engaging in a "back-to-back" letter of
credit transaction. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 708; id. § 18-9, at
752. One commmentator has labelled this financing function secondary, with the
payment function considered primary. Harfield, Secondary Uses of Commercial
Credits, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 899, 908 (1944); see, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (payment function); Pringle-
Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1978)
(security to short-term financers); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d
882, 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (long-term financing); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 (D. Md. 1982) (payment function), aff'd, 704
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
Under a back-to-back letter of credit, a bank will take an assignment of one
irrevocable letter of credit as security for the issuance of another irrevocable letter of
credit. Decker Steel Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 330 F.2d 82, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1964);
see U.C.C. § 5-116 official comment 1 (1977); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1,
§ 18-9, at 752. The letter of credit, including the right to draw, is assignable only if it
is expressly designated as assignable or transferable. U.C.C. § 5-116(1) (1977);
U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 54(b). Nevertheless, the assignor-beneficiary remains
liable for the nature of performance. U.C.C. § 5-116 official comment 2 (1977).
Even in the absence of an express provision, the right to the letter of credit proceeds is
always assignable. U.C.C. § 5-116(2) (1977); U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 55.
Alternatively, the beneficiary may discount the letter of credit to a local bank.
Gillette, Holders in Due Course in Documentary Letter of Credit Transactions, 1982
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 21, 33 (transferee is commonly the beneficiary's own bank);
H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 43 (beneficiary can obtain proceeds earlier through
discounting). Unlike straight credits, in which the issuer's engagement runs only to
the beneficiary and third parties may elect to purchase the beneficiary's drafts as
volunteers, negotiation credits permit discounting. J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 1, § 18-1, at 710; see H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 212. See generally Ufford,
Transfer and Assignment of Letters of Credit Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
7 Wayne L. Rev. 263 (1960) (discussing the ability of the beneficiary to negotiate). If
the transferee bank becomes a holder in due course, see U.C.C. § 3-302 (1977), it also
becomes a protected third party under Article 5, see id. § 5-114(2) (a).
11. A standby letter of credit is defined as "any letter of credit ... which
represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer . . . to make
[Vol. 52
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Given the tripartite contractual nature of the basic letter of credit
arrangement, and the possible addition of other parties when it is
payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the [customer], or. . . to
make payment on account of any default by the [customer] in the performance of an
obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1983). Similar definitions are stated by the
FDIC, id. § 337.2(a), and by the Federal Reserve Board, id. § 208.8(d)(1). The
standby letter of credit is similar to a guaranty or surety in that the issuer is obligated
to honor a demand for payment when there has been a failure of performance in the
underlying contract. See Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550
F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting district court's
memorandum decision); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F.
Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Harfield, The
Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 251, 258 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Harfield I]; McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Penalty
Clauses: An Unexpected Synergy, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 6 (1982); Weisz & Blackman,
Standby Letters of Credit After Iran: Remedies of the Account Party, 1982 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 355, 358. Certain form guidelines can be followed to avoid confusion between a
standby letter of credit and a guaranty. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 176-77; see 12
C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1983). The two devices are distinguished, however, in that the
obligation of a guarantor is secondary, whereas the obligation of an issuer is primary.
E.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank
of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 n.23 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1983). Moreover, the obligation of the guarantor does not mature until the prinicipal
debtor has actually defaulted; the issuer, however, is concerned only with documents
and not actual facts. E.g., Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) ("letter of credit" found to be
a guaranty because obligor's duty was conditioned upon actual default); J. White &
R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 713 (actual facts are irrelevant to issuer's
obligation). This is significant because the issuance of a guaranty is beyond the power
of a national bank. See Kimen v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 615, 617-18 (7th
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650 (1938); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the
Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 Banking L.J. 46, 62 (1979); see also 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1982) (powers of a national bank). The potential uses of the standby
letter of credit are numerous. See Kozolchyk, The Emerging Law of Standby Letters
of Credit and Bank Guarantees, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 319, 320 (1982) ("can encompass
virtually every obligation known to man") [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk II]; see,
e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 872-
73 (5th Cir. 1978) (to secure interim lenders); National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank,
551 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1977) (security for litigation bond); Chase Manhattan Bank
v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (to secure permanent financing);
Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(guaranty of salary payments); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp.
1107, 1115 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (substitute for working capital deposit); Thorup, Injunc-
tions Against Payment of Standby Letters of Credit: How Can Banks Best Protect
Themselves, 101 Banking L.J. 6, 8 (1984) (guaranty performance of debt securities);
Harfield I, supra, at 253 (support issuance of commercial paper by corporate bor-
rowers). As a matter of convenience, this Note is phrased in terms of the commercial
letter of credit, but the discussion is applicable to all types of the letter.
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confirmed,' 2 negotiated, 13 assigned or transferred, 14 the ways in which
a valid, irrevocable letter of credit can break down are numerous. 15
When a party to the letter of credit arrangement does not perform
12. A confirming bank is defined as "a bank which engages either that it will
itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be
honored by the issuer or a third bank." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) (1977); see, e.g.,
Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Voest-
Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), modified on other grounds, 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983); Lustrelon, Inc. v.
Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 139, 428 A.2d 518, 524 (App. Div. 1981). A benefi-
ciary, because it is not familiar with the issuer, may seek confirmation of the letter of
credit from a local bank. See R. Braucher & R. Riegert, Introduction to Commercial
Transactions 367 (1977); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 37; J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 1, § 18-1, at 710 n.21.
13. The beneficiary may discount its draft to a local bank. See H. Harfield, supra
note 1, at 35-36. As a result, the issuer becomes liable to the negotiating bank in the
same way the issuer was liable to the beneficiary. Id. at 36; see U.C.P., supra note 9,
art. 11(d); see, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569
F.2d 699, 704 (1st Cir. 1978); Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of India, 561 F. Supp. 246,
247 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The letter of credit itself, however, is not a negotiable instru-
ment, J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-9, at 747, because it does not meet
the requirement in Article 3 of the U.C.C. that a negotiable instrument must "con-
tain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money." U.C.C. § 3-
104(1) (b) (1977); accord Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452, 457-
58, 250 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (1977) (conditions precedent to payment and issuer's
duty to reject non-complying documents take the letter of credit out of the purview of
Minnesota's version of U.C.C. § 3-104(1)). Contra Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in 9
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law ch. 5, at 140 (1979) (conditions of
the letter of credit are mere formalities and tantamount to a signature under an
ordinary bank check) [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk III]. The draft presented under
the letter of credit, however, may be a negotiable instrument. See generally
Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Bus.
Law. 479 (1967) (discussing the characteristics of the beneficiary's draft).
14. The beneficiary's rights to draw on the letter of credit are not assignable or
transferable unless the letter expressly so provides. U.C.C. § 5-116(1) (1977); U.C.P.,
supra note 9, art. 54(b); accord Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 76 Ill. 2d 139,
148, 390 N.E.2d 894, 897 (1979); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn.
452, 458-59, 250 N.W.2d 172, 177 (1977). This rule protects the customer's interest
in the proper presentation of documents in that it is empowered to prevent someone
other than the party it has contracted with from making the presentment. H.
Harfield, supra note 1, at 180-81; Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 366; State of
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 123-24, reprinted in 1955 Report,
supra note 4, at 1691-92. The letter of credit proceeds, however, are assignable even
if the letter itself is expressly non-transferable. E.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 613
F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1980); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572, 1578 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. 1982); Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 76 Ill. 2d
139, 148-49, 390 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1979); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts.,
311 Minn. 452, 458-59, 250 N.W.2d 172, 177 (1977); U.C.C. § 5-116(2) (1977);
U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 55.
15. Litigation is frequent in the area of of documentary compliance. State of
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 64 & n.167, reprinted in 1955 Report,
supra note 4, at 1632 & n.167; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at
729; Comment, Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code:
[Vol. 52
LETTER OF CREDIT LITIGATION
properly, the economic interests of the other parties may be affected. 16
If such disputes result in litigation, multiple parties may be involved.
An Opportunity Missed, 62 Yale L.J. 227, 247 (1953); see, e.g., Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 172 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Flagship
Cruises, Ltd. v. New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 701-02 (1st Cir.
1978); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 804 (4th
Cir. 1975). Two major types of improper performance are payment by the issuer in
the absence of strict compliance of the beneficiary's presentment with the letter's
terms and refusal by the issuer to honor notwithstanding strict compliance. H.
Harfield, supra note 1, at 102. Wrongful dishonor occurs when "a draft or demand
for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit" is not honored by
the issuer. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977). The beneficiary's remedies are explicitly stated
in the U.C.C. Id. § 5-115. The customer's remedies for wrongful honor, however,
are not stated in the U.C.C., perhaps because "lawyers for issuers greatly influenced
the drafting of Article Five." J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 741
(footnote omitted); accord Note, Judicial Development of Letters of Credit Law: A
Reappraisal, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 144, 161 n.83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as judicial
Development]. The issuer, however, may be required to honor the beneficiary's non-
complying presentment if the custom of the trade so dictates, Dixon, Irmaos & Cia,
Ltda. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1944) (trade custom to treat
indemnity from a responsible bank as a sufficient substitute for compliance), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945), if the issuer waived the requirement or is estopped from
asserting it, see, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d
1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); International
Leather Distribs., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-03
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mere., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); United States Indus. v. Second
New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Conn. 1978), or if the issuer failed to
give notice of the non-compliance and thereby denied the beneficiary of its right to
cure, see, e.g., Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43,
48-49 (2d Cir. 1979); Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp.
1310, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D. Conn. 1980); U.C.P., supra
note 9, art. 16(d); see also Harfield I, supra note 11, at 257 ("any [party to a letter of
credit transaction] can go a long way toward messing it up"). For an inventory of
ways in which a valid irrevocable letter of credit may break down, see H. Harfield,
supra note 1, at 102-15; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, §§ 18-5 to -8, at 727-
46.
16. Generally, the letter of credit is the third agreement in a commercial ar-
rangement initially comprised of two independent contracts. East Girard Sav. Ass'n v
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979); Baker v. National Blvd.
Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Justice, Letters of Credit: Expecta-
tions and Frustrations (pt. 1), 94 Banking L.J. 424, 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Justice I]; Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 Stan. L. Rev.
716, 719 (1973); see, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d
1224, 1239 n.21 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting Comment, Commercial Letters of Credit:
Development and Expanded Use in Modern Commercial Transactions, 4 Cum.-Sam.
L. Rev. 134, 142 n.39 (1973)), cert. dismissed 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); First Nat'l Bank
v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814, 256 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1979). While the letter of
credit traditionally is viewed as a mere conduit of payment, see 1 A. Lowenfeld,
International Private Trade § 5-1, at 125 (2d ed. 1981), courts recently have applied
contract principles to the letter of credit. E.g., Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island
Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F.
Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn. 1980); West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp.
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The prospect of multiple-party litigation in letter of credit transac-
tions may implicate several aspects of procedural law. Four proce-
dural devices that may affect letter of credit transactions are compul-
sory joinder, intervention, impleader and attachment. For instance,
in an action between two parties to the letter of credit arrangement, a
third party may be deemed necessary or indispensable under Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules).17 In addition,
a party to the letter of credit arrangement that is not a party-litigant
may attempt to intervene in the action in order to protect its inter-
ests.' 8 Alternatively, a party-defendant in a letter of credit action may
wish to implead a third party to the transaction that may be secondar-
ily liable to the plaintiff. 19 Finally, when the beneficiary breaches the
1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381
F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974). In any event, the letter of credit serves a
ministerial function to facilitate trade because the issuer does not have discretion in
deciding whether to honor the beneficiary's draft. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Conn. 1980); see Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Joseph, Letters of Credit: The
Developing Concepts and Financing Functions, 94 Banking L.J. 816, 850-51 (1977).
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; e.g., Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543
F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig.,
420 F. Supp. 954, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391
A.2d 311, 315 (Me. 1978); Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin.
Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 226, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1312-13 (1976); see Faravelli v.
Bankers Trust Co., 85 A.D.2d 335, 337, 447 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964, aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d
615, 449 N.E.2d 1272, 463 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1983); J. White & R. Summers, supra note
1, § 18-7, at 745; State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99-102,
reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1667-70; Weisz & Blackman, supra note
11, at 364 n.35. Two courts have recognized the compulsory joinder issue, but failed
to decide it. See Canadian Transp. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 548 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir.
1977) (too many uncertainties to warrant a decision on the merits); Continental Time
Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (case dismissed in
favor of foreign litigation presenting same claims and issues).
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; see, e.g., National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nig., 425 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399
F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termoteenica
Campana, S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510, 512 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dynamics Corp. of
Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 996 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Pastor v.
National Republic Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 421, 423, 371 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (1977);
aff'd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979); see also Vazman, S.A. v. Fidelity Int'l
Bank, 418 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shipowners sought to intervene in
beneficiary's suit to recover demurrage from the issuer).
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14; see, e.g., Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A., Inc. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1979); Equilease Corp. v. Jefferson
Bank, 88 F.R.D. 208, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Telenet Co. v. Coin/Link Int'l Corp.,
No. 78-3329, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1979); Bank of the Southeast v. Jackson,
413 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Ala. 1982); Faravelli v. Bankers Trust Co., 85 A.D.2d 335,
336-37, 447 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (1982), afj'd, 59 N.Y.2d 615, 449 N.E.2d 1272, 463
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underlying contract, the customer may attempt to attach the proceeds
of the letter of credit while they are in the possession of the issuer,
thereby attempting to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over, and pre-
vent payment to, the beneficiary. 20
While the application of procedural law relating to multiple-party
litigation appears well-suited to letter of credit disputes, 21 substantive
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1983); Mid-States Mortgage Corp. v. National Bank of Southfield, 77
Mich. App. 651, 652, 259 N.W.2d 175, 176 (1977); cf. Atlas Assurance Co. v.
Harper, Robinson Shipping Co., 508 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1975) (insurance
company that paid negotiating bank for damaged goods sued time charterer who
impleaded the customer); Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F.
Supp. 408, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (foreign court granted issuer's application to join its
customer to the action); Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 317
n.8 (Me. 1978) (issuer's failure to implead its customer hinders its claim regarding
risk of inconsistent obligations in beneficiary's suit for wrongful dishonor).
20. See, e.g., Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira de Sisal, S.A., 450
F.2d 419, 421 app. (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972);
Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510,
512 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Tueta v. Rodriguez, 176 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Hohenberg Co. v. Comitex Knitters, Ltd., 104 Misc. 2d 232, 234-35, 428
N.Y.S.2d 156, 157-58 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Falk & Co. v. South Tex. Cotton Oil Co., 368
Pa. 199, 202, 82 A.2d 27, 29 (1951); cf. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (attachment of letter of credit proceeds
in action by beneficiary against issuer and customer), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979); Harvey Estes Contsr. Co. v. Dry Dock Sav. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 273
(W.D. Okla. 1974) (order to pay funds into court). It is important to know precisely
when the beneficiary's right to the letter of credit proceeds becomes unconditional,
because a contingent right cannot be attached or levied against. Frederick v. Chicago
Bearing Metal Co., 221 A.D. 588, 589-90, 224 N.Y.S. 629, 630 (1927); see, e.g., Dick
Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 700 F.2d 858, 861 (2d
Cir. 1983); Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira de Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d
419, 423 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972). It is unclear whether the
beneficiary's right becomes unconditional immediately on presentment or only after
the issuer has had a reasonable time to examine the presentment. State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 125 n.418, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note
4, at 1693 n.418.
21. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "govern the procedure in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature" and are to be "construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
The spirit of the rules requires that matters be viewed in their entirety, and that there
be a speedy adjudication of all controversies between the parties in a single action,
without multiplicity of suits. John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d
995, 997 (10th Cir. 1942); Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 123,
125 (5th Cir. 1939). One purpose of the rules is to encourage the consolidation of suits
involving related interests whenever fair and possible. Popkin v. Eastern Airlines,
204 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1962), modified on other grounds sub nom.
VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). In every litigation the federal judiciary
has an interest in having a whole case tried at one time. Hargrave v. Old Nursery,
Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980).
The litigation options discussed in this Note, however, are not limited to federal
forums; letter of credit litigation also occurs in state courts where state procedural
rules govern. See, e.g., First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 803-
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letter of credit law may pose a substantial obstacle to multiple-party
litigation.2 2 The letter of credit is viewed as entirely separate and
distinct from the underlying contract (independence principle)2 3 and
therefore, the issuer must honor a complying presentment unless the
situation is within a statutorily-defined exception. 24 The issuer is not
04, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (1980); Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d
311, 315 (Me. 1978); Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 131-32, 428
A.2d 518, 520 (App. Div. 1981).
22. For instance, the situation in which the customer sues the beneficiary and
attaches the issuer's payment obligation has been criticized as hostile to the letter of
credit device because a breach of contract claim thereby stops payment to the
beneficiary. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. Regarding the compul-
sory joinder device, it has been held that because the issuer-beneficiary relationship is
completely independent of the underlying contract, a suit for wrongful dishonor may
be fully adjudicated in the customer's absence. Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l
Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 316 (Me. 1978); cf. Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit
Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing indispensability of
beneficiary's partial assignee). Moreover, with respect to impleader, the substantive
letter of credit law obviated a finding of the requisite derivative liability of the third-
party defendant. Telenet Co. v. Coin/Link Int'l Corp., No. 78-3329, slip op. at 5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1979).
23. U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 3. An official comment to the UCC provides that
"[t]he letter of credit. . . is recognized by this Article as independent of the underly-
ing contract between the customer and the beneficiary." U.C.C. § 5-114 official
comment 1 (1977). This language has generally been interpreted to require complete
separation of the letter of credit from the underlying contract. See, e.g., KMW Int'l
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979); Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1972); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734, 736 (D. Minn. 1976); West Va. Hous. Dev.
Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 497-99, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977);
Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395, 146 N.E. 636, 639
(1925); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 28; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-
2, at 712.
24. U.C.C. § 5-114(1), (2) (1977). The issuer is liable if it fails to honor a
presentment that conforms to the requirements of the letter of credit, see, e.g.,
Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Crocker
First Nat'l Bank v. DeSousa, 27 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1928); Maurice O'Meara Co.
v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395, 146 N.E. 636, 639 (1925), even if the
goods do not conform to the specifications in the underlying contract. E.g., East
Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir.
1979); Asociacion de Azurcareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423
F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp.
776, 780 (D. Conn. 1980); cf. Banco di Roma v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F.
Supp. 817, 824 (D.N.J. 1979) (bank not required to honor non-complying drafts even
though goods complied with terms of the underlying contract). A statutory exception
to this independence principle exists when, inter alia, a document "is forged or
fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction." U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977). Under
such circumstances, the bank is permitted, but not required, to honor the draft, id.;
see Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1982); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
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concerned with the proper performance of the underlying contract, 25
but rather is concerned solely with the apparent compliance of the
required documents with the terms of the letter of credit. 2 This
independence principle may render the application of the multiple-
party procedural rules to letter of credit litigation questionable be-
cause application of the rules requires the resolution of issues common
to both the letter of credit and the underlying contract.
606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum), and the customer may seek to enjoin honor
in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977). See generally
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (customer may enjoin for fraud).
Fraud must be distinguished from mere breach of warranty. Id. at 721-22, 31
N.Y.S.2d at 634. One court has stated that fraud in the transaction exists for § 5-114
purposes when "the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transac-
tion that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would
no longer be served." Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336
A.2d 316, 324-25 (1975). U.C.C. § 5-114(2) applies to letters of credit governed by
the UCP, which does not contain an injunction provision. Weisz & Blackman, supra
note 11, at 368 n.45; see United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41
N.Y.2d 254, 258 n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947 n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 n.2 (1976).
25. See U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 4; U.C.C. §§ 5-109(1)(a), 5-114(1) (1977); H.
Harfield, supra note 1, at 71, 107; see, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Dulien Steel Prods. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1962); Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509
F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980);
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360
N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976). As a result, the issuer may not avail
itself of any legal defenses available to either party to the underlying contract. See,
e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602
(5th Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d
871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550
F.2d 1077, 1081-82 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memorandum
decision of lower court); Cappaert Enters., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Int'l Bank, 486 F.
Supp. 819, 826 (E.D. La. 1980); cf. First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App.
3d 802, 808, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1293-94 (1980) (issuer's liability unaffected by modifi-
cation of underlying contract); Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d
311, 320 (Me. 1978) (issuer not released from liability for wrongful dishonor by
settlement of underlying contract).
26. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977); see United States v. Sun Bank, 609 F.2d 832, 833
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (In-
deca) v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 100
(M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); First Arlington
Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 808, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (1980).
Moreover, the issuer must make its determination of documentary compliance in
good faith, U.C.C. §§ 5-109(1), 5-114(2)(b) (1977); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. Supp. 233, 237 n.13 (W.D. Okla.
1953), aff'd, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955), which is defined as "honesty in fact,"
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977); see Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128,
143-44, 428 A.2d 518, 526 (App. Div. 1981), and which may never be disclaimed,
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This Note examines the procedural devices of compulsory joinder,
intervention, impleader and attachment in the context of letter of
credit litigation. Part I discusses the application of the compulsory
joinder rule to letter of credit suits and examines which, if any, of the
parties to the letter of credit transaction should be deemed necessary
or indispensable to the litigation. Part II examines when a party to the
letter of credit arrangement is entitled to intervene, either permis-
sively or of right, in an action between other parties to the transac-
tion. Part III discusses the propriety of allowing a party-defendant in
a letter of credit case to implead a third party that is, or may be, liable
for all or part of the plaintiffs recovery. Part IV discusses whether the
customer may attach the letter of credit proceeds, while they are in
the possession of the issuer, in order to stop payment to, and establish
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over, the beneficiary.
Each Part of this Note concludes that in appropriate cases the
independence principle does not preclude the implementation of these
procedural devices in letter of credit litigation. This Note recognizes,
however, that an unbridled implementation of these procedural rules
will threaten the existence of the letter of credit as a means to facilitate
commercial transactions. Accordingly, a court in a letter of credit
dispute should not apply such rules summarily to all cases. The litiga-
tor, therefore, should view the suggestions presented in this Note as
options to be considered solely in limited, fact-specific situations.
I. PARTIES INDISPENSABLE TO LETTER OF CREDIT LITIGATION
Under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules,27 a party must be joined in an
action, if feasible, when complete relief cannot be granted in his
absence, 2 or when disposition in his absence will either impair his
ability to protect affected interests or subject the parties already be-
fore the court to multiple or inconsistent obligations.29 When joinder
is not feasible, a court has discretion to treat the party as dispensable
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. One of the main purposes of this rule is to avoid multiple
litigation of essentially the same issues. E.g., CBS v. Film Corp. of Am., 545 F.
Supp. 1382, 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 831, 836 (D. Del. 1978). Rule 19, therefore, should be construed broadly. See,
e.g., Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Japan Petroleum Co. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 836.
28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
29. Id. R. 19(a)(2). A party is "necessary" when he possesses such an interest that
he should be joined to determine the entire controversy, but his interest is separable.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495, 500 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1966); Savoia Film
S.A.I. v. Vanguard Films, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). A necessary party
is "desirable" as opposed to indispensable. Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139, 142
(E.D. Va. 1970).
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and thus proceed in his absence.30 Alternatively, a court may classify
the party as indispensable and dismiss the action.31 In determining
indispensability, a court examines the extent to which a judgment will
be prejudicial to the absent or existing parties, 32 the extent to which
this prejudice can be lessened or avoided, 33 the adequacy of the rem-
edy rendered in the party's absence34 and the availability of an ade-
quate alternative remedy for the plaintiff if the action is dismissed.35
In a typical tripartite letter of credit arrangement, the relationship
between any two parties is generally independent of any other two-
party relationship.36 This principle appears to preclude the use of the
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The test is whether, "in equity and good conscience,"
the suit should proceed. Id.; Francis Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 661 F.2d 873,
878 (10th Cir. 1981); Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977);
Laird v. Chrysler Corp., 92 F.R.D. 473, 474 (D. Mass. 1981).
31. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). A party is deemed indispensable only after a court
has determined that the litigation may not, in equity and good conscience, proceed in
the party's absence. E.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 118-19 (1968); Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129, 139 (1854);
Challenge Homes, Inc. v. Greater Naples Care Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 667, 669 & n.3
(11th Cir. 1982); Fletcher Aircraft Co. v. Bond, 77 F.R.D. 47, 52-53 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). A pragmatic approach should be used in determining
prejudicial effect. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 110 (1968); Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 874-75 (5th Cir.
1970); Gram v. May, 41 F.R.D. 52, 54 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885,
887 (5th Cir. 1979); Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249, 257-58 (8th Cir.
1970); Estate of Johnson v. Bellville Hosp., 56 F.R.D. 380, 384 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Anrig v. Ringsby United, 591 F.2d 485, 491 (9th
Cir. 1978); Trebesch v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 79, 80 (D.
Minn. 1980).
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The availability of an alternative forum in the event
the action is dismissed is a critical consideration in determining the indispensability
of the absent party. E.g., Pasco Int'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d
496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885, 888 (5th
Cir. 1979); Anrig v. Ringsby United, 591 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1978). If no
alternative forum exists, "plaintiff's interest in having the federal forum would
strongly influence a court to find that the absent person was not indispensable."
Pasco Int'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d at 500. Moreover, the
factors listed in Rule 19(b) are not exclusive and must be applied pragmatically,
focusing on the facts of each case. Bio-Analytical Servs., Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp.,
Inc., 565 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); see, e.g.,
Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F. 2d 1102, 1108 (4th Cir. 1980);
Smith v. State Fire and Cas. Co., 633 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1980); Prescription
Plan Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 1977).
36. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711-12; Harfield,
Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 239, 241-42 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Harfield II]; see, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606
F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F.
Supp. 386, 395 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Colorado Nat'l
Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
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compulsory joinder doctrine in letter of credit litigation. For example,
in an action on the underlying contract for either nonpayment or
inadequate performance, the issuer is not a party to be joined if
feasible. 37 Under the independence principle, the issuer has no legal
interest in the actual performance of the underlying contract, 3 and
therefore, is not connected with the customer's suit for the receipt of
noncomplying goods. 39 Alternatively, when the beneficiary sues the
customer for nonpayment after having substantially performed the
underlying contract and after the issuer has dishonored the beneficia-
ry's draft, complete relief can be granted in the issuer's absence.
40
Such a disposition does not lead to inconsistent or multiple obliga-
tions. Even if the beneficiary prevails, the customer, after making
payment directly, has no duty to reimburse the issuer. 41 Thus, the
issuer should never be classified as a Rule 19(a) party.
37. Cf. Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495, 500 n.4 (9th Cir. 1966) (a party "must be
interested" in the controversy to be classified as necessary); Horwich v. Price, 25
F.R.D. 500, 504 (W.D. Mich. 1960) (same); Savoia Film S.A.I. v. Vanguard Films,
Inc., 10 F.R.D. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (same). The issuer is not an interested party
because it deals in documents, not in goods. See supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
38. See U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) (1977); U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 3. Allowing or
requiring the issuer to monitor the performance of the underlying contract "would
impose upon a bank a duty which in many cases would defeat the primary purpose
of" the letter of credit, which is to assure the beneficiary of "prompt payment against
documents." Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 397, 146
N.E. 636, 639 (1925); accord Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank,
528 F.2d 802, 805 (4th Cir. 1975); see Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. South-
ern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. The issuer may not raise any defenses its customer has against the benefi-
ciary. East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602
(5th Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank,
571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978) (inadequate performance of the underlying con-
tract by the beneficiary does not affect the issuer's liability to the beneficiary); Bossier
Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same) (adopting district court's memorandum decision).
40. In the event of dishonor, "the beneficiary may still recover from the customer
in an action on the underlying contract." J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-
6, at 728; see Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43,
47 (2d Cir. 1979); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp.
193, 195-96 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Bank of United States v. Seltzer, 233 A.D. 225, 231,
251 N.Y.S. 637, 644 (1931); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 72-73.
41. The issuer's right to reimbursement is contingent upon its "duly honoring"
the beneficiary's draft. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) & official comment 3 (1977); accord
U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 16(a). A draft is duly honored when it complies facially or
when the issuer is entitled to honor in good faith despite the customer's allegations of
fraud in the transaction. U.C.C. § 5-114 & official comment 3 (1977); see Bossier
Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting district court's memorandum decision); Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995-96 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
When the customer pays the beneficiary's draft, it may offset the amount paid
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The compulsory joinder doctrine, however, may be applied to cases
in which several parties have some degree of interest in common, by
which a "community of interest"42 exists among the multiple contracts
involved. 43 For example, the beneficiaries of a trust agreement typi-
cally are classified as indispensable to an action affecting the trust
property. 44 Arguably, under certain circumstances, this "community
of interest" doctrine applies to the multi-contractual credit arrange-
ment. Admittedly, the relationships within the arrangement are not
interdependent with respect to the mutual performance obligations
existing between any two parties. 45 Nevertheless, the letter of credit
arrangement would not arise but for the underlying contract that it
supports. 46 The letter of credit, therefore, is related to the existence
and operation of the underlying contract if only to the extent that the
beneficiary typically must present evidence of his performance of the
underlying contract before the issuer's payment obligation is trig-
gered 47 and the issuer must forward the presented documents to the
customer in seeking reimbursement. 48 Thus, while the independence
against any claim of the issuer on the letter of credit. Bank of United States v. Seltzer,
233 A.D. 225, 231, 251 N.Y.S. 637, 644 (1931); 6 Michie, supra note 1, ch. 12, § 33b,
at 440.
42. 3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 19.18[1], at 19-335 (2d
ed. 1982); see Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 U.S. 152, 159, 161 (1924);
Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Kury, 88 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
43. 3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 42, 19.18[1], at 19-335 ("[A] commu-
nity of interest may arise out of contracts which, while several in form, are interde-
pendent in substance and operation.").
44. See, e.g., Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960); Hood v. James, 256 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir. 1958).
45. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
46. A letter of credit "depends for its effectiveness upon the inducement it holds
forth to third parties-to the beneficiary and to the negotiating bank or correspon-
dent." H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 221. Letters of credit serve a ministerial function
in financing the underlying contract. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage
Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers
Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1962); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 780-81 (D. Conn. 1980); Joseph, supra note 16, at 850-51.
47. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
48. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-5, at 727. The customer may
waive nonconformity in the beneficiary's presentment. See, e.g., Corporacion de
Mereadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Cour-
taulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 806-07 (4th Cir.
1975); International Leather Distribs., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp.
1197, 1201-02 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979). The issuer
would then be required to honor the presentment as if it complied strictly. See
Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d at 807; Interna-
tional Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. at 1201-03; North
Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413
N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1979) (mem.).
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principle may limit the use of the compulsory joinder doctrine in letter
of credit cases, it should not foreclose summarily the doctrine's appli-
cation. An analysis of the various relationships within the letter of
credit arrangement suggests that compulsory joinder should be ap-
plied to letter of credit litigation solely in limited circumstances.
A. The Customer v. The Issuer
In a customer's action to enjoin the issuer from honoring the benefi-
ciary's presentment, requiring the joinder of the beneficiary is appro-
priate because the injunction may violate the beneficiary's rights to
payment under the letter of credit. 49 The issuer may interpose the
injunction as a defense to an action by the beneficiary for wrongful
dishonor,50 thereby potentially depriving the beneficiary of its right to
legal process under the letter of credit.5 ' It is arguable, therefore, that
the beneficiary should be joined, if feasible. Disposition of the injunc-
tion proceeding in the beneficiary's absence will significantly impair
its ability to protect its interest in the letter of credit proceeds, 52 and
may in certain situations expose the issuer to inconsistent obligations.53
49. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 745; State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at
1667; see Thorup, supra note 11, at 15; Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 364
n.35; see also Canadian Transp. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 548 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir.
1977) (issue recognized but not decided); Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust &
Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 70 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (same); United Bank Ltd. v.
Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 260 n.4, 360 N.E.2d 943, 949 n.4,
392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 n.4 (1976) (same).
50. Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 101, reprinted in 1955 Report,
supra note 4, at 1669; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 744-45.
The injunction may not excuse the issuer if the issuer's conduct or inactivity has
contributed to the granting of the injunction. Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1319-20 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); see
Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1975); Kama Rippa Music, Inc. v.
Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1975); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note
7, § 13-4, at 486.
51. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 101, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 4, at 1669. Wrongful dishonor occurs when "a draft or demand
for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit" is not honored by
the issuer. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977). See generally J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 1, § 18-6 (analysis of variations of wrongful dishonor and the remedies available
to beneficiary); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 109-10 (same).
52. See supra note 49. In Citibank, N.A. v. Klein, 396 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), the court held that the issuer's honor may not be enjoined in the absence
of jurisdiction over the beneficiary. Id. at 764.
53. In Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), the issuer argued that a
state court injunction against honor foreclosed the beneficiary from obtaining relief
for wrongful dishonor. Id. at 1319. The court rejected this contention, holding that
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In determining whether the beneficiary should be classified as indis-
pensable, several procedural issues are implicated. Initially, a court
will align the parties according to their true interests before determin-
ing whether diversity exists.5 4 Diversity jurisdiction must continue to
exist after joinder.55 Accordingly, it may be impossible to join the
beneficiary, depending on its domicile.5 6 The beneficiary's joinder,
however, should rarely present a problem in this regard because its
interests are diametrically opposed to those of the customer,5 7 and the
letter of credit is most often utilized when the parties to the underly-
ing contract are from markets located in either different states or
nations .
5
an injunction order will not protect an issuer when the issuer has not actively
contested the injunction action, id. at 1320, and when the beneficiary was not a
party to the action. Id. at 1319; see Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021,
1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (in answering beneficiary's claim for wrongful dishonor,
issuer argued that an injunction prevented it from honoring the presentment despite
the beneficiary's contention that the issuer did not oppose the issuance of the injunc-
tion); cf. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977)
(failure of customer to put the issuer in funds is no defense in suit by the beneficiary
for wrongful dishonor); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776,
788 (D. Conn. 1980) (same).
54. Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 494 F. Supp.
1139, 1150 (D. Del. 1980); see, e.g., Eikel v. States Marine Lines, 473 F.2d 959, 963-
64 (5th Cir. 1973); Mission Ins. Co. v. Mackey, 340 F. Supp. 824, 829 (W.D. Mo.
1971).
55. Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1971); Jett v. Zink,
362 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966); Delta Drilling Co. v.
Arnett, 186 F.2d 481, 487 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951);
Codagnone v. Perrin, 351 F. Supp. 1126, 1130-31 (D.R.I. 1972); see 3A J. Moore &
J. Lucas, supra note 42, 19.04[2.-1].
56. Joinder would not be possible when the beneficiary and the customer are
domiciliaries of the same state. See, e.g., West Va. Hous. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F.
Supp. 1107, 1110 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391
A.2d 311, 314 (Me. 1978); Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin.
Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 220-22, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1309-10 (1976).
57. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 104; see Thorup, supra note 11, at 14. These
disparate interests are reflected in cases when the beneficiary or its successor inter-
venes in the customer's suit for an injunction. See infra note 103 and accompanying
text.
58. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 19 ("[T]he financial requirements of local
markets ordinarily create no demand for the particular utility of the commercial
letter of credit."); see Tueta v. Rodriguez, 176 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); U.C.C. § 5-112 official comment 2 (1977); see, e.g., Standard Fittings Co. v.
Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 630, 631 (5th Cir. 1980) (customer from Louisiana, benefi-
ciary from France), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg.,
Inc., 534 F. Supp. 153, 154-55 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (customer from Michigan, benefi-
ciary from the Phillipines); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F.
Supp. 893, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (customer from New York, Nigerian beneficiary),
aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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In addition, in the event that the beneficiary is not amenable to suit
and cannot be joined, a serious conflict arises between the beneficia-
ry's interest in receiving payment and the customer's intention to
exercise his legal right to an injunction in the case of a fraudulent
transaction or presentment. 59 If the beneficiary is classified as indis-
pensable, resulting in a dismissal of the action, the customer may be
left without an adequate alternative remedy.60 For example, if a
customer attempts to enjoin the issuer from honoring the presentment
of a foreign beneficiary and the beneficiary is classified as indispensa-
ble, no adequate remedy may exist. 61 Initially, the beneficiary may
not be amenable to suit in the customer's forum. 62 Moreover, while
the beneficiary is the stakeholder of the letter of credit proceeds, 3 it
may be unlikely that the beneficiary will hold these proceeds pending
the outcome of litigation in the beneficiary's forum.6 4
To avoid this result, a court should not deem the beneficiary indis-
pensable to the action if the issuer adequately represents and protects
the beneficiary's interest. If the issuer has an interest in preventing the
issuance of the injunction in order to protect its "commercial honor"6 5
59. See U.C.C. 5-114(2)(b) (1977). If the indispensable beneficiary is not amena-
ble to suit and the case is dismissed, the customer is foreclosed from seeking an
injunction against honor when it is most critically needed. State of N.Y. Law Revi-
sion Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1667.
Conversely, "by holding that the beneficiary is not an indispensable party, and by
issuing an injunction in his absence, a court may violate the beneficiary's rights." Id.;
see Thorup, supra note 11, at 14-15.
60. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 4, at 1667. An adequate alternative forum is perhaps the most
critical factor listed in Rule 19(b). See supra note 35. See also Ramsey v. Bomin
Testing, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 335, 338 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (an additional factor is the
traditional right of the plaintiff to control his own litigation).
61. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 89, 99, reprinted in
1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1657, 1667.
62. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 4, at 1667; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 745;
Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 360; see, e.g., H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated
Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979);
American Steel, Inc. v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 301, 303-04
(S.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 548 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1977).
63. 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.52(b), at 143; Weisz & Blackman, supra
note 11, at 375; Note, Confirming Bank Liability in Letter of Credit Transactions:
Whose Bank Is It Anyway?, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1219, 1224 (1983).
64. See Canadian Transp. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 548 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir.
1977); cf. Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 74
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (political unrest in beneficiary's forum rendered foreign litigation
dubious); NMC Enters., Inc. v. CBS, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427, 1428-
29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (fraudulent call on letter of credit may bankrupt the
customer).
65. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1979);
Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D. Mass. 1981); Werner
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and to guard against subsequent reprisals by out-of-state or foreign
banks or corporations,6 6 the beneficiary's interest will be adequately
represented.
The issues of adequacy of representation and indispensability, how-
ever, may be avoided altogether if the court finds that the beneficia-
ry's contacts with the forum state through its involvement in the credit
arrangement render it fair and reasonable to compel the beneficiary to
litigate in that forum.67 Alternatively, even if the court decides the
beneficiary's contacts are insufficient, it need not dismiss the action
outright. It may, under Rule 19(b) ,68 exercise its discretion to limit the
action to a preliminary injunction or some other modified form of
relief6 9 in order to lessen the extent to which a judgment will be
prejudicial to the absent or existing parties.7 0 While this alternative
may lessen the inequitable effect on the beneficiary, its utility may be
limited because, as a general rule, time is of the essence in a letter of
credit transaction. 7' Thus, even a temporary denial of access to the
Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 75 (W.D. Mich.
1980); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473,
477 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thorup, supra note 11, at 13-14; Weisz & Blackman, supra
note 11, at 372-73.
66. KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1979);
Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 75 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420,
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 372-73; see State of N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 102 n.327, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra
note 4, at 1670 n.327.
67. E.g., K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 153, 159 (E.D. Mich
1981); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893, 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Barnes v.
Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Sheldon Steel Corp. v.
Standard Fruit Co., 219 F. Supp. 521, 527-28 (D. Del. 1963).
68. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
69. A court must consider "the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided." Id. Moreover, a court may modify an injunction request in balancing
the equities of the affected parties. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies
§ 2.10, at 111 (1973); see, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606
F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (notice injunction granted instead of requested prelimi-
nary injunction); Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F.
Supp. 65, 75-76 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (same); American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
70. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 101-02, reprinted
in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1669-70.
71. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218
F.2d 831, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1955); see, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hyland Hills Metro. Park & Recrea-
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letter of credit proceeds may have a permanent deleterious effect on
the beneficiary.72 In any event, the customer should always seek to
join the beneficiary, or give it formal notice of the action, to obviate
having to ask the court to affect the rights of an absent party. 73
B. The Beneficiary v. The Issuer
In an action by the beneficiary against the issuer for wrongful
dishonor, the customer arguably should not be classified as an indis-
pensable party or even a party to be joined if feasible because the
customer's interest is limited to its duty to reimburse the issuer for duly
honoring the letter of credit.7 4 Consistent with this proposition, the
independence principle establishes that the issuer's payment obliga-
tion is independent of the issuer-customer and customer-beneficiary
relationships. 75 Notwithstanding the independence principle, how-
ever, precluding the customer from being joined in the beneficiary's
suit in an appropriate case may expose parties already before the court
to multiple obligations.76
tion Dist. v. McCouy Enters., 38 Colo. App. 23, 26, 554 P.2d 708, 710 (1976); G.
Jaris Co. v. Banque D'Athenes, 246 Mass. 546, 549, 141 N.E. 576, 577 (1923); Banco
Tornquist, S.A. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 71 Misc. 2d 874, 874-75, 337
N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
72. Under the U.C.C., the issuer must determine whether or not to honor the
beneficiary's draft by "the close of the third banking day following receipt of the
documents," U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a) (1977), unless the beneficiary consents to a later
date, id. § 5-112(1)(b). Failure to honor within this time constitutes dishonor of the
letter of credit. Id. § 5-112(1). Under the U.C.P., notice of dishonor must be given
"without delay." U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 16(d). Beyond these waiting periods,
denial of the letter of credit proceeds may constitute a material breach of the issuer's
payment obligation. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 7, § 11-22, at 407-10.
73. Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 364 n.35; see, e.g., Steinmeyer v.
Warner Consol. Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 515, 517-18, 116 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1974);
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 256-57, 360
N.E.2d 943, 946-47, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (1976); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 720, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Thorup,
supra note 11, at 15.
74. See Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077,
1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977) (adopting district court's memorandum decision);
U.C.C. § 5-114(3) & official comment 3 (1977). The customer has been found to be
indispensable to an action for an injunction against the issuer. See Edgewater Constr.
Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227-28, 357 N.E.2d
1307, 1313-14 (1976).
75. Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 316 (Me. 1978). See
supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
76. See Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 316 n.6 (Me.
1978); Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). A purpose of Rule 19 is to avoid multiple litigation. See
supra note 27.
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For instance, in Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.,7 7 the
beneficiary fraudulently sent rubbish to the customer in performing
the underlying contract for the sale of brush bristles. 78 Such fraud in
the transaction is not always evident on the face of the documents,
which can appear to comply strictly with the terms of the credit but
actually do not comply due to the beneficiary's fraud in the induce-
ment of the sales contract.79 In such cases, the issuer is permitted, but
not required, to honor the beneficiary's draft.80 In a suit for wrongful
dishonor, the issuer's defense is inexorably tied to the beneficiary's
fraudulent performance of the underlying contract. 8' In addition, the
customer has a legal right to seek to enjoin the bank's honoring the
draft.8 2 Therefore, the customer should be classified as a party to be
joined if feasible under Rule 19(a). If the beneficiary prevails in the
customer's absence, the customer's ability to protect its interest will be
impaired and the issuer may be exposed to multiple litigation or
inconsistent obligations.8 3 For example, after the issuer is ordered to
honor the beneficiary's presentment, the issuer may be forced to sue
for reimbursement from the customer, resulting in multiple litiga-
tion.84
77. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
78. Id. at 720, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
79. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635-36; see NMC Enters., Inc. v. CBS, 14 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427, 1430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); O'Grady v. First Union
Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 233-34, 250 S.E.2d 587, 601 (1978). This is consistent with
the view that the "fraud in the transaction" defense exists when there is fraud in the
underlying transaction. See, e.g., Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank &
Trust Co., 409 F.2d 711, 712 (1st Cir. 1969); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265,
270 (1976). See infra note 168.
80. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977); see Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650, 656 (8th Cir. 1982); Scarsdale
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F. Supp. 378, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
81. See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
254, 259, 360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976); NMC Enters., Inc. v.
CBS, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427, 1430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); O'Grady
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 233-34, 250 S.E.2d 587, 601 (1978).
82. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977).
83. Such a result would contravene the Federal Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
See supra note 27.
84. See Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 316 n.6 (Me.
1978). A letter of credit may be revocable or irrevocable. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a)
(1977); U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 7(a). Because it can be modified or canceled
without notice, the revocable letter of credit has been termed an illusory contract.
West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
Because revocable credits are of little utility, see H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 40, 47,
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A court rarely will classify a customer indispensable."5 In fact, a
court typically will not reach an analysis of Rule 19(b) factors because
it usually will be able to require a customer's joinder. 86 The customer's
entrance into the action should rarely present jurisdictional problems
because the customer ordinarily will seek to procure the issuance of
the letter of credit from a local bank.87 Thus, in the normal case, the
customer will be subject to service of process and its joinder will not
deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 8
II. INTERVENTION IN LETTER OF CREIIT LITIGATION
Under Rule 24(a),89 a party may intervene of right in a pending
action when, upon timely application, it claims an interest related to
the subject matter of the action90 that is not adequately represented by
prospective beneficiaries usually prefer irrevocable credits. J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 1, § 18-4, at 721; see Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F.
Supp. 776, 783 (D. Conn. 1980) (presumed irrevocability); U.C.C. § 5-106 official
comment 2 (1977) (revocable credit has "no legal significance" concerning the cus-
tomer and beneficiary). But see Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F.
Supp. 1133, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (letter silent on the issue deemed revocable);
U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 7(c) (letter presumed to be revocable in the absence of any
contrary indication).
85. See Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 317 n.8 (Me.
1978). The one case in which the customer was deemed indispensable is rather
anomalous because the suit to enjoin the issuer from honoring the draft was initiated
by a corporation, all the stock of which was owned by the general partner of the
limited partnership on whose behalf the letter of credit was issued. Edgewater
Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App.. 3d 220, 222-26, 357
N.E.2d 1307, 1310-13 (1976).
86. A court will not reach the issue of indispensability unless a party to be joined
if feasible cannot be made a party to the action because either he is not amenable to
suit within the forum or his joinder will destroy subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 19; see, e.g., Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d 703,
707 (3d Cir. 1940); Laird v. Chrysler Corp., 92 F.R.D. 473, 474 (D. Mass. 1981);
Mayer v. Development Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 917, 922 (D. Del. 1975).
87. See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593
F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1979); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp.
776, 778 (D. Conn. 1980); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1022
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 314 (Me.
1978). A customer typically "turns to some bank in his own locality ... which is
sufficiently well known abroad to make its obligation, evidenced by a... letter of
credit," a useful financing device. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 34; accord Thorup,
supra note 11, at 14.
88. See, e.g., Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386,
387 n.1 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Dynamics Corp. of Am.
v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 993 & n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Process
may be served anywhere within the forum state, or outside the state but within 100
miles from the place in which the action is commenced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
90. Id. This interest must be a substantial and legally protectable interest in the
proceedings. E.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); Diaz v.
Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
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a party to the action.91 Under Rule 24(b), 92 a party may intervene
permissively if its application is timely and a common question of law
or fact exists between the applicant's interest and the main action. 93
Intervention of right is distinguished from permissive intervention
in that the former involves a question of law while the latter is at the
discretion of the court.9 4 Courts, however, do not adhere fastidiously
to this distinction. 5 An applicant generally attempts to intervene
under both sections, and a court may grant this request without
specifying under which section it is permitting intervention. 6 In addi-
tion, while only Rule 24(b) requires the court to justify its exercise of
discretion,9 7 both sections require timely applications by prospective
intervenors.98 The determination of timeliness requires a balancing of
(1970); Lane v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 93 F.R.D. 611, 614 (D. Md. 1982); United
States v. Wood, 435 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W.D. Ky. 1977). The "interest" test is a
"practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned
persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process." Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate
Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 412 (D. Minn. 1972).
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a); see Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683, 691 (1961); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1960); Roe v. Casey,
464 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1978), af'd, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980).
92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
93. Id. Rule 24(b) does not require that the prospective intervenor's interest be
direct, personal or pecuniary. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434, 459 (1940); In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 925 (1976); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765,
769 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956); Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. Co., 34 F. Supp. 594, 596 (E.D. Wis. 1940)
(quoting SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459
(1940)).
94. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) ("anyone shall be permitted to intervene")
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("anyone may be permitted to intervene"); e.g., Athens
Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982);
Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting Bumgarner v. Ute
Indian Tribe, 417 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1969)); Montgomery v. Rumsfeld,
572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978); Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222,
1225 (6th Cir. 1975); Medd v. Westcott, 32 F.R.D. 25, 28 (N.D. Iowa 1963); see 7A
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1902 (1981).
95. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 94, § 1902.
96. Id.; see, e.g., Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A.,
358 F. Supp. 510, 512 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co.,
33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473, 1476 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982).
97. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties."); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 191-92 (2d
Cir. 1978); Davis v. Board of School Comm'r, 517 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Degge v. City of Boulder, 336 F.2d 220, 222 (10th
Cir. 1964).
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b).
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interests presented by the original parties, the applicant and the pub-
lie. 99
The letter of credit is a product of economic convenience and serves
the financial interests of the various parties. 100 Accordingly, the inter-
vention doctrine may serve an important function in letter of credit
litigation. While the obligations in the letter of credit transaction are
separate and distinct from the obligations in the underlying con-
tract, 10 1 a deficient performance in one transaction may have finan-
cial repercussions in another. 102 Thus, a third party arguably may seek
to intervene in order to protect its own pecuniary interests without
impinging upon the independence principle. 10 3 Liberal use of inter-
vention, however, may have a chilling effect on prospective partici-
pants to the letter of credit arrangement because an intervenor may
present additional issues that could delay litigation. 0 4 The ability of a
99. See, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 579, 582-85 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 297 (1982); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263-66
(5th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. United Air Lines, 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975); Smith
Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1970);
1A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 94, § 1901.
100. See East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir.
1979); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1970); Bank of Newport v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1572, 1576-77 (D.N.D. 1981), afj'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
650 (8th Cir. 1982).
101. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d
Cir. 1977) (waiving lateness and honoring presentment may adversely affect issuer's
ability to obtain reimbursement from its customer); Consolidated Aluminum Corp.
v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 388-90 (D. Md. 1982) (nonpayment on underlying
contract caused beneficiary to call on letter of credit which was dishonored because it
was received after expiration date due to mail delay), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1983); NMC Enters., Inc. v. CBS, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427, 1429
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (unjustified demand by beneficiary may lead to customer's
bankruptcy); cf. Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F.
Supp. 92, 102-03 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (apparent insolvency of customer may compel
issuer to scrutinize beneficiary's presentment more closely for non-compliance), rev'd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
103. See, e.g., National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 425 F. Supp.
1365, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1022
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A., 358
F. Supp. 510, 512 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473, 1476 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982); Pastor v. National
Republic Bank, 56 Il. App. 3d 421, 425, 371 N.E.2d 1127, 1129-30 (1978), alf'd, 76
Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979).
104. For this reason litigants generally prefer to see the intervenor's application
denied. See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 425 F. Supp. 1365,
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 94, § 1901, at 465 n.11.
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party to the letter of credit to intervene, therefore, should be re-
stricted. This chilling effect, however, may not be a significant factor
because prospective participants do not always anticipate litigation
and intervention prior to entering the letter of credit arrangement.
A. The Ability of the Beneficiary to Intervene
Generally, a third party to a contractual agreement may intervene
of right only if the contracting parties have intended to confer a
benefit upon him.105 It is not enough that some benefit inures to this
third party as an incident of performance. 10 6 In the letter of credit
arrangement, the customer-issuer relationship is contractual,'0 7 and
the terms of the letter of credit typically state that it is issued "in favor
of" the beneficiary.10 8 Thus, in a suit by the customer to enjoin the
issuer from honoring a draft, the beneficiary may be entitled to inter-
vene of right if the issuer does not adequately represent the beneficia-
ry's interests.' ° ° If an injunction issues, the beneficiary will be im-
105. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 230
(1912); Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir.
1979); Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1979); Ogden
Dev. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1974); Vazman, S.A. v.
Fidelity Int'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
106. Norfolk & W. Co. v. United States, 641 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1980);
Vazman, S.A. v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see
Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1979);
Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1979).
107. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979); East Girard Sav. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir.
1979); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975); H.
Harfield, supra note 1, at 52, 103; Verkuil, supra note 16, at 719. Through its
application, the customer specifies the terms of the letter of credit. J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-4, at 722; see, e.g., Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe,
261 N.Y. 150, 155-56, 184 N.E. 741, 742-43 (1933) (customer specified terms); H.
Harfield, supra note 1, at 310-11 (sample application form); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra
note 16, supp. at 77 (same).
108. E.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d
871, 873 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978); Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira De Sisal,
S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 994 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank of N.C., 296 N.C. 212, 229, 250 S.E.2d 587, 598
(1978); Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App.
3d 220, 224, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1976); see H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 318-31
(sample letters of credit).
109. See Vazman, S.A. v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (dictum). Though the issuer-customer agreement intentionally benefits the
beneficiary, the beneficiary technically is not a third-party beneficiary of this con-
tract. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 714; see Comment, Letters of
Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev. 581, 590 (1979). In a third-
party beneficiary contract, the promisor can set up any defense against the third-
party beneficiary that it could assert against the promisee. J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
supra note 7, § 17-8, at 623. By contrast, the issuer must honor a complying present-
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peded from protecting its interest in the letter of credit proceeds. 110 In
addition, the beneficiary is able to contribute to the resolution of the
factual issues presented in the customer's allegations of a forged or
fraudulent presentment, or fraud in the transaction."'
The issuer's interest in protecting its reputation in the financial
community, however, may compel it to oppose the customer's suit
strenuously.1 2 The significance of the issuer's commercial reputation
is evident because the issuer may choose to honor the beneficiary's
draft even after receiving notice from the customer of a fraudulent
transaction."13 From a legal perspective, the issuer may contest the
customer's suit actively to avoid being subject to a subsequent suit by
the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor. 4 The issuer's representation of
ment despite any claims it may have against its customer. East Girard Say. Ass'n v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); see Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977); Baker v. National
Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text. Some courts, however, have characterized the letter of credit as
a third-party beneficiary contract. E.g., West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F.
Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (quoting Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry
Dock Sav. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974)); Courtaulds N. Am.,
Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 98 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say.
Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
110. See Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 745; State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra note 4, at 99, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1667;
Thorup, supra note 11, at 14; Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 364 n.35; cf.
Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 371 N.E.2d 1127, 1129-
30 (1977) (discussing interests of the beneficiary's liquidator who seeks to intervene in
the customer's injunction action against the issuer), aff'd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d
894 (1979).
111. See Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1023-24 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (intervenor-beneficiary contended that customer and issuer shared an interest
in dishonor because issuer feared an inability to obtain reimbursement from the
insolvent customer). A right to intervene arises only when "the prospective intervenor
appears to have a sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute to the
resolution of the controversy." Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99,
102 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds, 473 F.2d 580
(9th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Rule 24(a) is not "a comprehensive
inventory of the allowable instances for intervention" of right, Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505 (1941)), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956), and therefore a court should consider that evidence
presented by the beneficiary may lead to a speedy and economical resolution of the
controversy. See United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir.
1975).
112. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
113. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977).
114. Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1319-20
(S.D.N.Y.) (injunction will not excuse honor if issuer's conduct or nonfeasance con-
tributed to the issuance of the injunction order), af'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d
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the beneficiary's interest in receiving payment, therefore, may fore-
close the latter from intervening under Rule 24(a).
Situations exist, however, in which the issuer does not adequately
represent the interests of the beneficiary. For instance, even if the
customer is financially sound and the issuer's prospect of reimburse-
ment is secure, the beneficiary's interest may be adverse to the issuer's
interest because the issuer does not have the same stake in the outcome
of the action."15 While generally the issuer is interested in paying the
beneficiary upon presentment in order to protect its commercial repu-
tation," 6 at times the issuer may not adequately represent the benefi-
ciary's interest because it may have a longstanding business relation-
ship with the customer."17 Accordingly, the issuer may be hesitant to
disregard its customer's allegation of fraud particularly when pay-
ment on the fraudulent call may lead to the financial collapse of the
customer."" The adequacy of the issuer's representation of the benefi-
ciary's interest depends on a balancing of the interests presented by
the issuer's commercial honor and its business relationship with the
customer. Such a determination, therefore, should be dispositive of
whether the beneficiary is able to intervene in the customer's injunc-
tion proceeding.
B. The Ability of the Customer to Intervene
When the beneficiary sues the issuer for wrongful dishonor, the
customer has a direct pecuniary interest in the litigation because the
Cir. 1980). See supra note 50. The issuer also may actively contest the suit to avoid
subsequent reprisals by foreign banks or corporations. See supra note 66.
115. E.g., Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 56 111. App. 3d 421, 425, 371 N.E.2d
1127, 1129-30 (1977), aff'd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979); see Bank of
Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (S.D.N.Y.) (issuer did
not actively contest the injunction proceeding), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d
Cir. 1980); cf. Thorup, supra note 11, at 14 (characterizing injunction proceeding as
ex parte). Furthermore, the interests of the applicant and the litigants "need not be
wholly 'adverse' before there is a basis for concluding that existing representation of a
'different' interest may be inadequate." Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); see Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D.R.I. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071
(1980).
116. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
117. Thorup, supra note 11, at 14; see Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 373.
The applicant's burden of showing inadequate representation "should be treated as
minimal," Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972),
and a court should be more inclined to find inadequate representation when the
applicant is willing to bear the costs of litigation, because the applicant is the best
judge of his own interests. 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 94, § 1909, at 522
(1972).
118. Thorup, supra note 11, at 14; cf. Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d
1326, 1328-30 (9th Cir. 1982) (advising bank knowingly accepted false documents in
honoring the beneficiary's draft in order to apply the proceeds to the balance of a
loan it had outstanding with the beneficiary).
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customer will be obligated to reimburse the issuer if the beneficiary
prevails." 9 Under Rule 24(a), however, the customer may not be able
to intervene of right when the beneficiary's deficient performance is
limited to its documentary presentment because the disposition of the
letter of credit litigation does not impair or impede the customer's
ability to protect his interest in the underlying contract. 20 Alterna-
tively, when the beneficiary's performance is lacking in both the
presentment transaction and the underlying contract, as in a fraud
situation, the customer's underlying contractual interests may be jeop-
ardized by the disposition of the letter of credit case.' 2' Nevertheless,
the issuer's representation of the customer's interest may preclude the
latter's intervention of right. Typically, the issuer will contest the
beneficiary's suit actively, 22 particularly when the prospect of reim-
bursement from the customer is dubious due either to its financial
119. See Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1321
(S.D.N.Y.) (customer concedes liability if issuer is ordered to pay the beneficiary),
aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F.
Supp. 1021, 1024-25 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (issuer may look to its customer for reimburse-
ment after honor); Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 371
N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (1977) (same), aff'd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979).
120. See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1979)
(preliminary injunction vacated for lack of irreparable harm because customer's
action on the underlying contract may provide an adequate remedy); U.C.C. § 5-109
official comment 1 (1977) ("[tlhe customer will normally have direct recourse against
the beneficiary if performance fails").
121. Under the view that fraud in the underlying transaction provides a basis for
enjoining payment to the beneficiary, see infra note 168, if the suit against the issuer
for wrongful dishonor is decided in favor of the beneficiary, the customer may be
collaterally estopped from asserting fraud in its suit against the beneficiary on the
underlying contract. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 n.23
(1979) (issue conclusively decided in one proceeding is excluded from the fact-finding
process of a subsequent proceeding); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573,
593 (1974) (same); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897)
(same). For collateral estoppel to apply, the non-party must be in "privity" with the
litigant. Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. at 48-49. It is commonly
recognized, however, "that the privity label simply expresses a conclusion that pre-
clusion [of the issue] is proper." 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4449, at 418 (1981); see Bruszewski v. United States, 181
F.2d 419, 422 & n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
122. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171,
172 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern
Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1978); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1975); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 779 (D. Conn. 1980); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v.
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 194-95 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Oriental
Pac. (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 78 Misc. 2d 819, 819, 357 N.Y.S.2d
957, 958-59 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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instability or to its ability to prevail in a subsequent suit for wrongful
honor.123
The customer, however, should be permitted to intervene permis-
sively in the beneficiary's suit when common issues of law or fact
affect both the issuer-beneficiary and customer-beneficiary relation-
ships. 2 4 The customer's pecuniary interests are implicated regardless
of the ultimate outcome of the litigation. 125 If the beneficiary prevails,
the customer may be obligated to reimburse the issuer.' 26 Conversely,
if the issuer prevails, the customer is not automatically relieved of its
contractual obligation to the beneficiary. 127 The justification for the
issuer's dishonor, however, might also enable the customer to void the
underlying contract. 128 Permitting the customer's intervention under
Rule 24(b), therefore, may contribute to the resolution of the contro-
versy because it may present important evidence otherwise unavail-
able to the court. 29 Thus, the court should balance the prospective
123. See, e.g., Transamerica Delaval, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 200,
205 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (issuer may not release itself from liability for wrongful
honor through a provision in the agreement with its customer); Baker v. National
Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (issuer offered state court
injunction in defense of beneficiary's suit for fear that collection from the customer
would not be possible); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387
F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (M.D.N.C.) (issuer unsuccessfully attempted to avoid payment
with a technical defense of non-literal compliance after its customer had filed for
bankruptcy), rev'd and remanded, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975) (issuer's tactic
successful).
124. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (common issues of law and/or fact permit interven-
tion).
125. See Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 371 N.E.2d
1127, 1129-30 (1977), affd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979). This is more than
is required under Rule 24(b), see supra note 93, because it is enough to have a mere
economic interest in the outcome. E.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Allendale
Co., 226 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 409,
415 (S.D.N.Y 1974).
126. See Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995-96
(N.D. Ga. 1973); U.C.C § 5-114(3) & official comment 3 (1977).
127. See supra note 40. Moreover, the beneficiary is not presumed to take the
letter of credit proceeds in absolute payment of the underlying contract. Greenough
v. Munroe, 53 F.2d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 1931); 6 Michie, supra note 1, ch. 12, § 33, at
440; see Note, Recourse Against the Buyer in a Letter of Credit Transaction, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 294, 296 (1926).
128. This may be limited to cases in which U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) is construed to
include fraud in the underlying transaction as grounds for justifiable dishonor. See
supra note 168. The beneficiary will be unable to enforce a fraudulently performed
contract. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 7, § 22-5, at 785. Under the
doctrine of in pari delicto, if the beneficiary is not guilty of serious moral turpitude it
may be entitled to a quasi-contractual recovery. Id. § 22-12, at 794; Restatement of
Contracts § 604 (1932).
129. The issuer is obligated to examine the documents against the letter of credit
in good faith, see U.C.C. § 5-109(1), (2) (1977), and need not go behind the
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delay to be caused by the customer's intervention against the advan-
tage of disposing of all related claims and defenses in one proceeding
and the public interest in the efficient operation of the courts. 130
By contrast, if the issuer receives improper documents from the
beneficiary, but honors the draft due to the apparent conformity of
the presentment, it later may sue the beneficiary for breach of war-
ranty under section 5-111(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).1"' Under such circumstances, the customer has a pecuniary
interest in the litigation relative to the issuer's right to seek reimburse-
ment for duly honoring the beneficiary's draft, and may seek to
intervene. 132 While Rule 24 should be construed liberally, 133 sound
policy dictates that it should not be applied indiscriminately. 34 In the
above situation, the customer can contribute little to the resolution of
the controversy because the documents, the focus of the litigation, are
documents in examining the beneficiary's presentment. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th
Cir. 1975); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D.
Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Conn. 1980). Therefore, the issuer may be unable to
discern fraud in the transaction, when the presented documents apparently comply
to the terms of the letter of credit, without the assistance of its customer. See U.C.C.
§ 5-114 official comment 2 (1977); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn.
452, 462-63, 250 N.W.2d 172, 179 (1977) (issuer received notice of the alleged
falsification of apparently complying documents only after its customer commenced
an action for an injunction).
130. See Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1975); Pace
v. First Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D. Kan. 1965), aff'd, 404 F.2d 52 (10th Cir.
1968).
131. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-8, at 745-46. U.C.C. § 5-
111(1) (1977) provides that "the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a documen-
tary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the necessary
conditions of the credit have been complied with," unless otherwise agreed. Id. This
"gives an issuer who wrongfully honors a [draft] a remedy against the beneficiary."
Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, 80 Wis. 2d 513, 524 n.22, 259 N.W.2d 310, 315
n.22 (1977); cf. Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 433,
434-35, 440 N.E.2d 968, 969-70 (1982) (suit by advising bank against beneficiary for
breach of warranty on presentment).
132. See supra note 126.
133. E.g., Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1953); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 396 (D. Kan. 1979); Greer v. Blum, 462 F. Supp. 619, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lipsett v. United States, 37 F.R.D. 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Tatum v. Cardillo, 11 F.R.D. 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F.R.D. 197, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
134. E.g., Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131, 135 (D.
Minn. 1966); see Warheit v. Osten, 57 F.R.D. 629, 630 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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in the possession of the issuer. In addition, the issuer's interest in
avoiding payment is substantial because it usually will bring suit
against the beneficiary only when reimbursement is not readily avail-
able from its customer. 135 Hence, the customer's entrance into the
action will be of little or no utility, and intervention should be denied
under either section of Rule 24.
III. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN LETTER OF CREDIT CASES
Under Rule 14,136 a third-party plaintiff is entitled to implead a
person "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him."137 If the third-party plaintiff, in the absence of the
original plaintiff's action, continues to have a claim against the third-
party defendant, impleader may not be used. 13 Thus, impleader is
appropriate only when the third-party defendant's liability is contin-
gent upon the third-party plaintiff being found liable to the original
plaintiff. 139 The main purpose of impleader is to promote judicial
economy by avoiding the situation in which a defendant is forced to
bring a new and separate action against a third party who may be
liable for all or part of the original plaintiff's recovery.140 As a result,
135. If the issuer honors in good faith, it has a right of reimbursement against the
customer despite the beneficiary's breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 5-114 official com-
ment 2 (1977). The issuer, however, may disregard this litigation option if the
customer is financially unsound, cf. Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp.
1021, 1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (injunction action uncontested by issuer because
reimbursement from customer was dubious); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92, 103 (M.D.N.C.) (dishonor after picayune
documentary examination because reimbursement was dubious), rev'd on other
grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975), or may prevail on a claim of wrongful honor.
See supra note 123.
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.
1975); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449,
450 (10th Cir. 1967); A.J. Kellos Constr. Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 86 F.R.D. 544, 545
(S.D. Ga. 1980); Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 417 F. Supp. 738, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
139. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 368 n.3
(1978); Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1967); Tesch
v. United States, 546 F. Supp. 526, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tower Mortgage Corp. v.
Reynolds, 81 F.R.D. 560, 561-62 (W.D. Okla. 1978); United States v. Scott, 18
F.R.D. 324, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
140. 6 C. Wright & A, Miller, supra note 94, § 1442, at 202-03; see, e.g., Lasa Per
L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir.
1969); Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43, 50 (4th Cir. 1962);
Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1959); Powell, Inc. v. Abney, 83
F.R.D. 482, 485 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Colton v. Swain, 358 F. Supp. 859, 862-63 (N.D.
Ill. 1973), af'd, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Rule 14 should be construed liberally, subject to this derivative liabil-
ity requirement. 141
The tripartite nature of the basic letter of credit arrangement ap-
pears suitable for third-party practice. The independence principle,
however, poses a substantial obstacle to satisfying the derivative liabil-
ity requirement. For example, if the beneficiary sues the customer for
nonpayment on the underlying contract, the customer may not be
able to implead the issuer effectively for failing to honor the present-
ment because two separate and distinct legal obligations are in-
volved. 142 Nevertheless, in this situation, absent the beneficiary's
action, the customer is without a claim against the issuer. 4 3 Thus, the
independence principle may not preclude a finding of derivative lia-
bility in an appropriate case.
A. The Customer as the Third-Party Defendant
The issuer may attempt to implead its customer as one "who is or
may be liable" to it for the beneficiary's claim of wrongful dishonor.
When the customer fraudulently procures the issuance of the credit,
the third-party complaint against the customer may adequately allege
the requisite derivative liability for impleader. 144 Derivative liability
141. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771, 773 (10th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 975 (1954); Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481, 484 (4th Cir.
1947); Wanta v. Powers, 478 F. Supp. 990, 993 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Tower Mortgage
Corp. v. Reynolds, 81 F.R.D. 560, 561 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Stiber v. United States,
60 F.R.D. 668, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
142. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977); U.C.P. art. 8(c) (1974); see, e.g.,
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979) (letter of
credit and underlying contract are separate and distinct); Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1972) (same); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970) (same). In such a case, the
beneficiary may have a choice of suing the customer on the underlying contract, see
supra note 40, or the issuer for wrongful dishonor. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1977).
143. The issuer owes its customer a duty to examine, in good faith, the beneficia-
ry's presentment for facial compliance with the terms of the letter of credit. U.C.C.
§ 5-109(1), (2) (1977). Beyond this, the extent of the issuer's obligation is governed by
its contractual agreement with the customer. Id. official comment 1 (1977); see J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-7, at 741-42.
144. Equilease Corp. v. Jefferson Bank, 88 F.R.D. 208, 209 & n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1980). Other cases in which the customer has been impleaded include Toyota Indus.
Trucks U.S.A., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1979);
Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980); Bank of the Southeast v. Jackson, 413 So. 2d 1091,
1092 (Ala. 1982); Mid-States Mortgage Corp. v. National Bank, 77 Mich. App. 651,
653, 259 N.W.2d 175, 176 (1977); cf. Housing See., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391
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exists because, absent the beneficiary's claim, the issuer would not
have an action against its customer.' 4 This analysis can be extended to
permit the issuer to implead the customer when the latter conveys
false information for the express purpose of preventing the beneficiary
from receiving the letter of credit proceeds.' 46 The customer has an
incentive to misrepresent the facts of the transaction in order to pre-
vent payment when, absent fraud, it receives non-conforming goods
on the underlying contract,' 47 or when it seeks to avoid the financial
effects of its bad business judgment. 148 Permitting the use of Rule 14 in
such situations will serve the primary purpose of the Rule by enabling
the issuer to avoid having to institute a new and separate claim against
the customer for all or part of the beneficiary's recovery.149
The requisite derivative liability is absent in the beneficiary's action
for wrongful dishonor, however, when the issuer impleads the cus-
tomer for failing to deposit funds with the issuer sufficient to cover the
A.2d 311, 317 n.8 (Me. 1978) (issuer's failure to implead its customer diminishes its
assertion regarding risk of inconsistent obligations).
145. See supra note 138.
146. Because the issuer is concerned only with documents, see supra note 25, it is
dependent upon its customer for the transmission of facts which may justify dishonor.
See supra note 129.
147. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 706 (discussing benefi-
ciary's risks of the customer's dishonesty and contractual disputes). It is possible that
the customer need not misrepresent the facts to the issuer when the proper perform-
ance of the underlying contract is itself a condition of payment. See In re Pine Tree
Elec. Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 343, 346-47 (D. Me. 1981); Bank of the
Southeast v. Jackson, 413 So. 2d 1091, 1095-99 (Ala. 1982); Raiffeisen-Zentralkasse
Tirol Reg. Gen. M.B.H. v. First Nat'l Bank, 671 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Colo. App. 1983).
It is possible to condition payment on the conformity of the goods to specified
standards if the intent to do so is clear. Continental Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l City Bank, 69
F.2d 312, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934). But see U.C.P., supra
note 9, art. 3 (issuers are not concerned with underlying contract even if the letter of
credit specifically refers to such contract).
148. For instance, in National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 448 F.
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), the beneficiary
apparently sought to corner the world's supply of cement, id. at 626, but this caused
severe congestion problems at the port of Lagos and the beneficiary had to place an
embargo on the port. Id. at 627. Due to this large volume, the beneficiary was
unable to pay demurrage charges, id. at 629, which payment was supported by an
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 627. Moreover, customers
vigilantly search for a defect in the presentment when the price of goods drops
precipitously, Kozolchyk III, supra note 13, at 82. A thorough examination can
usually disclose at least one defect. 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.55(d), at 147-
48 (quoting G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 3-23, at 120 (2d ed.
1975)); accord State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 4, at 66-67, reprinted
in 1955 Report, supra note 4, at 1634-35.
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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issuer's payment obligation. 50 The customer's failure in this instance
pertains only to the issuer-customer contract.' 51 The independence
principle dictates that the issuer cannot consider the prospect or ade-
quacy of the buyer-customer's ability to put the issuer in funds in
determining whether to honor the beneficiary's demand for pay-
ment. 52 Derivative liability is lacking because if the issuer honors the
beneficiary's presentment, it still may maintain a breach of contract
action against the customer. 53 Thus, Rule 14 is unavailable to the
issuer under such circumstances. If so impleaded, the customer should
move to dismiss the complaint, or the court should deny the defend-
ant-issuer's motion for leave to implead.154
B. The Beneficiary as a Third-Party Defendant
The issuer may seek to implead the beneficiary for presenting
forged, fraudulent or other non-complying documents when the cus-
tomer sues the issuer for wrongful honor. 155 The issuer's duty in exam-
150. See Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465,
469-70 (3d Cir. 1979); cf. Mid-States Mortgage Corp. v. National Bank, 77 Mich.
App. 651, 653, 259 N.W.2d 175, 176 (1977) (customers defaulted on loan payment).
151. The customer's promise to reimburse or put the bank in funds is explicitly
provided for in the Code, subject to the parties' agreement. U.C.C. § 5-114(3)
(1977); accord U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 16(a); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016(e) (1983).
152. The issuer may not raise any defenses it may have against its customer if the
beneficiary makes a complying presentment. See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Chase Manhat-
tan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1977); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D. Conn. 1980); Baker v. National Blvd.
Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-25 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
153. See U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1977); U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 16(a); 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7016(e) (1983); cf. Banco di Roma v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 817,
824, 826-27 (D.N.J. 1979) (issuer had right to reimbursement upon a justified dis-
honor after advising bank wrongfully made payment).
154. The customer's motion would be for failure of the issuer to state a claim for
which relief could be granted due to the independent nature of the issuer's third-
party claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 14(a); see, e.g., U.S. Gen., Inc. v. City of
Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1979) (third-party claim independent of
original claim properly dismissed); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American
State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir. 1967) (same); Independent Liberty Life Ins.
Co. v. Fiduciary Gen. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 535, 537 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (same). If the
third-party complaint is filed 10 days or longer after the defendant serves his original
answer, he must obtain leave to file this complaint upon notice to all parties to the
action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a), and the use of impleader here is discretionary. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 14 advisory committee note, reprinted in 31 F.R.D. 635, 636 (1962).
155. Cases are rare "in which [the issue of wrongful honor] was squarely raised
and decided," and it is improbable "that such a case would arise," because generally
the beneficiary's presentment "[is] not lightly dishonored." H. Harfield, supra note 1,
at 111. Nevertheless, the litigation option exists. See, e.g., Transamerica Delaval,
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ining the beneficiary's presentment is merely to check one document
against another in good faith.156 The superficial and ministerial nature
of this duty may give rise to a situation in which a reasonably diligent
documentary examination will not reveal the deficiencies in the pre-
sentment. The beneficiary, therefore, may be secondarily liable for
any loss incurred by the customer as a result of the beneficiary's
breach of warranty under section 5-111(1) of the UCC. 157 Moreover,
the adequacy of the issuer's performance may be a controverted issue.
Such a case presents a classic example of the derivative liability re-
quirement: The issuer denies its liability to the customer, but if found
liable for wrongful honor, it should be indemnified by the beneficiary
for damages payable to the customer.15
8
Derivative liability is absent when the customer, after a reasonable
time for inspection, elects to accept the non-conforming documents
and waive the defect.' 59 Impleader would not be proper because the
issuer's responsibilities are discharged by the customer's acceptance of
the documents, 60 and an action will lie by the customer directly
against the beneficiary by virtue of the underlying contract or section
5-111(1) of the UCC.' 1'
Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Interco, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716, 719-20 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated
on other grounds sub. nom. Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480 (1st Cir.
1977); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 110-11; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1,
§ 18-8, at 746.
156. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977). See supra notes 25-26.
157. U.C.C. § 5-111(1) (1977). See supra note 131.
158. See supra notes 138-39. Claims of indemnity, subrogation, contribution and
breach of warranty are ideally suited to the derivative liability requirement of Rule
14. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 94, § 1446, at 246-48.
159. See, e.g., Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d
43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528
F.2d 802, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1975); International Leather Distribs., Inc. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-02 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd mem., 607 F.2d 996
(2d Cir. 1979); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 732-33; Kozolchyk
III, supra note 13, at 81 & n.451.
160. Upon the customer's waiver, the issuer is obligated to honor the beneficiary's
draft as if it had strictly complied with the terms of the letter of credit. See Cour-
taulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1975);
International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-
03 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am. Trading Corp.
v. General Elec., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702-03 (1979).
161. See U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 2 (1977). The customer, as an "inter-
ested party," benefits from the beneficiary's warranty of presentment. Id. § 5-111(1);
Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 524 n.22, 259 N.W.2d
310, 315 n.22 (1977); see Pubali Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 &
n.5 (9th Cir. 1982).
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When the issuer sues the customer for reimbursement, the latter
may assert as an affirmative defense that the issuer failed in its duty to
examine the beneficiary's presentment in good faith.162 Alternatively,
the customer may seek to implead the beneficiary under section 5-
111(1) of the UCC.163 The independence principle does not interfere
with the customer's third-party complaint because by statute the ben-
eficiary warrants "to all interested parties"' 64 that its documentary
presentment complies with the necessary conditions of the letter of
credit. 16 5 The derivative liability requirement, however, may pre-
clude the use of Rule 14 in this situation because the customer retains
the right to sue the beneficiary for breach of warranty concerning its
presentment even in the absence of the issuer's claim for reimburse-
ment. 1
66
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE ATTACHMENT MANEUVER
Section 5-114(2) of the UCC 16 7 enables the customer by legal proc-
ess to enjoin the issuer from honoring the beneficiary's documentary
demand for payment under the letter of credit when the documents
presented are forged or fraudulent, or there is fraud in the transac-
tion. 68 Rather than resort to this equitable remedy, some customers
162. See Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 364, 336 A.2d
316, 327 (1975); U.C.C. § 5-109(1) (1977). Every duty in the Code includes a duty of
good faith. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977). Accordingly, the issuer's duty of good faith under
§ 5-109 has been extended to the beneficiary. AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray
Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Ariz. 1978).
163. See supra note 161.
164. U.C.C. § 5-111(1) (1977).
165. Id.
166. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 2 (1977) ("In the event of honor, an action
by the customer against the beneficiary will lie by virtue of either the underlying
contract or section 5-111(1) of [the UCC.]"). This remedy is not contingent upon the
customer being held liable to the issuer for reimbursement, and therefore would
constitute an improper third-party complaint. See supra notes 138-39 and accompa-
nying text.
167. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977).
168. Id.; see, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d
1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982); Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,
484 F. Supp. 65, 73 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (dictum); Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust
Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 358-59, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25 (1975). See generally Harfield,
Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 Banking L.J. 596 (1978) (discussing
fraud as basis for injunction) [hereinafter cited as Harfield III]; Judicial Develop-
ment, supra note 15, at 162-63 (same). Because the UCC does not define "fraud in
the transaction," see U.C.C. § 5-114(2) and official comment 2, application of this
defense is not uniform. Some courts accept this defense when there is active fraud in
the underlying contract. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719
F.2d 583, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1983); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust
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presented are forged or fraudulent, or there is fraud in the transac-
tion. 168 Rather than resort to this equitable remedy, some customers
have elected to sue the beneficiary for breach of the underlying con-
tract, or a warranty incidental thereto, and attach the issuer's pay-
ment obligation by appropriate state or local procedure.6 9 In so
doing, the customer seeks to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over, and
prevent payment to, the beneficiary. 70 Reported cases involving this
attachment maneuver are rare. In addition, commentators are critical
of this concept' 7 1 because it threatens the basic foundation and com-
mercial utility of letters of credit by violating the independence princi-
ple. 172
Co., 409 F.2d 711, 712-13 (1st Cir. 1969); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dictum); Colorado Nat'l Bank v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 39-40 (Colo. 1981) (en bane); United Bank
Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 260-61, 360 N.E.2d 943,
949, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 (1976); Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa.
343, 359, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25 (1975). Other courts require the fraud to exist in the
presentment transaction itself. See, e.g., West Va. Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F.
Supp. 1107, 1114-15 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311
Minn. 452, 464, 250 N.W.2d 172, 180 (1977); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank,
296 N.C. 212, 233-34, 250 S.E.2d 587, 600-01 (1978); Thorup, supra note 11, at 16.
These views are not necessarily mutually exclusive because the presentment transac-
tion typically will be fraudulent to the extent that the underlying transaction is
marred by the beneficiary's active or egregious fraud. Compare H. Harfield, supra
note 1, at 82-83 (independence principle dictates that the exception should be limited
to when fraud occurs only in the letter of credit transaction itself) with Harfield III,
supra, at 614-15 (injunctions should issue only when fraud in the underlying contract
is intentional and egregious). Thus, the distinction that fraud under § 5-114(2) must
be "intrinsic to the documents" and not just to the underlying contract may be
specious. NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. CBS, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427,
1430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 736-37;
see Thorup, supra note 11, at 10 n.12.
169. E.g., Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira de Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d
419, 421 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Lantz Int'l Corp. v.
Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F. Supp. 510, 511-13 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Tueta v. Rodriguez, 176 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Hohen-
burg Co. v. Comitex Knitters, Ltd., 104 Misc. 2d 232, 232, 428 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157
(Sup. Ct. 1980); see Falk & Co. v. South Tex. Cotton Oil Co., 368 Pa. 199, 200-03,
82 A.2d 27, 29 (1951); cf. Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F.
Supp. 271, 273 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (beneficiary ordered to pay proceeds into court);
Mareva Compania Naviera, S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers, S.A., 2 Lloyd's L.R.
509, 510 (C.A. 1975) (prohibiting beneficiary from seeking honor).
170. See supra notes 20, 169 and accompanying text.
171. Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustations-Part 2, 94 Banking
L.J. 493, 495 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Justice II].
172. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-10, at 752-53 (attachment
maneuver is hostile to the letter of credit arrangement); 100 Banking L.J. 730, 730
(1983) (deemed an "end run" whereby customer seeks judicial intervention to prevent
honor not by way of an injunction, but furtively by attaching the credit proceeds
while they are still in the hands of the issuer); Justice II, supra note 171, at 495 (the
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In determining the efficacy of the attachment maneuver to establish
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over and to block payment to the benefi-
ciary, two issues must be examined. Initially, when the letter of credit
is the beneficiary's sole contact with the forum state, it must be
determined whether a party's involvement in the letter of credit ar-
rangement alone is sufficient to establish quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 73
In addition, it must be determined whether this maneuver has any
commercial utility in light of its inconsistency with the independence
principle.
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Letter of Credit Cases
The Supreme Court has held that, in order to establish in personam
or quasi-in rem jurisdiction, a party must have sufficient "minimum
contacts" with the forum state1 74 so that compelling the party to
litigate in the forum does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
attachment procedure has an "insidious effect" on the dependability of the letter of
credit device because it interferes with the bepeficiary's expectations without directly
challenging the near-absolute character of the issuer's payment obligation).
173. An initial distinction must be made between general and specific or limited
jurisdiction. Under the former, the relationship between the defendant and the
forum is sufficient to support jurisdiction even if the plaintiffs claim is unrelated to
the defendant's contacts, provided that the defendant's forum-related activities are
".substantial" or "continuous and systematic." H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated
Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Data
Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
Under a general jurisdiction analysis, defendant's unrelated contacts with the forum
must be more substantial than when the defendant's contacts give rise to plaintiff's
claims. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958); Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1963); Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., 425 F. Supp.
376, 379 (E.D. Wa. 1976). Even if general jurisdiction is lacking, jurisdiction may
still lie if the nature and quality of defendant's activities in the forum, which give rise
to plaintiff's claim, make the assertion of jurisdiction fair and reasonable in the
particular case. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1977); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945); H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated
Banking Corp., 592 F.2d at 552. This Note is concerned with specific jursidiction.
For cases discussing general jurisdiction and the letter of credit contact, see Standard
Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 630, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 910 (1981); K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 153, 159 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893,
906 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982);
Barnes v. Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116, 118-19 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Sheldon Steel
Corp. v. Standard Fruit Co., 219 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D. Del. 1963).
174. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
207, 211-12 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319-20
(1945).
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and substantial justice.'U7 5 A sufficient minimum contact is an act "by
which [a] defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.' 176 When dealing with quasi-in-rem juris-
diction, the presence within the forum of a res that is directly related
to the action may provide a sufficient contact to establish personal
jurisdiction. 177 By contrast, the mere presence within a forum of a res
that is unrelated to the action generally does not in itself establish
personal jurisdiction over the affected party.17 8
The beneficiary's involvement in the letter of credit arrangement
may be a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the imposition of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the issuer's payment obligation. Typi-
175. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
176. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (exercising the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within a state, thereby enjoying the benefits and protection of the laws of that
state, gives rise to the concomitant duty to subject oneself to the court's personal
jurisdiction); see, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381
(6th Cir. 1968); Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 168-
69 (D. Minn. 1969); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d 68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965).
177. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). For instance, "when claims to
the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff
and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located
not to have jurisdiction" because this would normally indicate that the defendant
"expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest." Id. at 207-08 (foot-
notes omitted). A judgment quasi-in-rem affects the rights of particular persons in a
designated res. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958). The plaintiff may
use this form of jurisdiction to secure a claim in the subject matter and extinguish
similar claims of particular persons, or to apply property that is concededly the
defendant's to the satisfaction of a claim against him. Id.; see Restatement of Judg-
ments §§ 3, 5-9 (1942). Nevertheless, "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny,"
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted), which is a "fairness stan-
dard." Id. at 211.
178. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977). The fifth amendment due
process clause imposes no jurisdictional limits on the federal courts within the United
States. See Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Fitz-
simmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878)); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138,
1143 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974). But see National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (jurisdictional limits on state courts should
apply to federal courts in diversity cases). Federal courts nevertheless exercise self-
restraint regarding personal jurisdiction and generally will reach only as far as state
courts can. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963); 2
J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 42, 4.25[7]; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note
94, § 1075.
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cally, the customer seeks to attach the issuer's payment obligation
after the beneficiary demands payment but before payment is actually
made. 79 In making its demand for payment under the letter of credit,
the beneficiary secures the benefits and protections of the laws of the
state in which the letter of credit is issued. 180 The availability of legal
sanctions to compel the obligor's performance or to provide compen-
satory substitutes for such performance is an important component of
credit.18 ' Once a letter of credit is established, a legally enforceable
obligation arises running directly from the issuer to the beneficiary. 182
179. E.g., Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecncia Compana, S.p.A., 358 F.
Supp. 510, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 A.D. 27,
31, 35 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (1951); Falk & Co. v. South Tex. Cotton Oil Co., 368 Pa.
199, 205-06, 82 A.2d 27, 31 (1951); cf. Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira
de Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1971) (attachment ineffective because
effective presentment not yet made), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Tueta v.
Rodriguez, 176 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (same).
180. The issuer is legally obligated to pay the beneficiary if complying documents
are tendered. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977); see, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage
Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank &
Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, 1081 app. A (6th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (adopting memorandum decision of lower court); AMF Head Sports
Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D.
Ariz. 1978). Some courts have characterized the issuer-beneficiary relationship as
contractual. E.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 235 (5th
Cir. 1983); East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598,
601 (5th Cir. 1979); Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th
Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir.
1970). No consideration, however, is necessary to establish the letter of credit,
U.C.C. § 5-105 (1977); see Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
611 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1979); Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d
at 207, and there is no mutual assent between the issuer and the beneficiary, J. White
& R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711; Joseph, supra note 16, at 850-51;
Comment, Letter of Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev. 581, 588-
90 (1979). Perhaps the better view is "to call a letter of credit a transaction sui
generis-a relationship with no perfect analogies but nevertheless a well defined set
of rights and obligations." 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.53, at 144 (footnote
omitted); accord Joseph, supra note 16, at 850-51; see H. Harfield, supra note 1, at
53; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711.
181. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 3; see Richard v. American Union Bank, 123
Misc. 92, 95, 204 N.Y.S. 719, 722 (Sup. Ct.) ("a credit ... is a claim or cause of
action for money"), rev'd on other grounds, 210 A.D. 22, 205 N.Y.S. 622 (1924),
afJ'd, 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925); cf. 1 Michie, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 3
(nature of banking business requires state and federal legislation to protect deposi-
tors). Two other components of credit include the acceptance of a duty by the obligor
and the presumed ability of the obligor to perform that duty. H. Harfield, supra note
1, at 3.
182. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-2, at 711; see Baker v. National
Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 & n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Schweibish v. Pont-
chartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 734-35 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
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In addition, the beneficiary derives substantial commercial advan-
tages from the issuance of the letter of credit. Commercially, the
beneficiary may be unwilling to enter into the underlying contract
unless the credit of the issuer is substituted for that of the customer.1 8 3
Moreover, through the issuance of the letter of credit, the beneficiary
is protected against the prospective insolvency or dishonesty of the
customer, 18 4 and therefore is able to participate in a wider range of
interstate and international trade.8 5
The nature of the plaintiffs claim may determine whether the
issuer's payment obligation is related or unrelated to the suit. If the
suit is for breach of the underlying contract, the independence princi-
ple dictates that the issuer's payment obligation is entirely unrelated to
the suit."' Hence, contacts in addition to the letter of credit arrange-
ment would be necessary to subject the beneficiary to a court's juris-
diction. If the case is based on the "fraud in the transaction" excep-
tion'17 to the independence principle, however, no basis exists for a
183. H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 17-18; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1,
§ 18-1, at 707-08; see East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593
F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d
461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970).
184. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Comm'n to
the Legislature Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, Legislative Doc. No.
65(A), at 5, 35 (1956), reprinted in State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report and
Appendices Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code 15, 45 (1956); see East Girard
Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979);
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 394 (D. Md. 1982),
aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.3, at 130; J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 706-08; Harfield II, supra note 36, at
241; McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 5.
185. See Sheldon Steel Corp. v. Standard Fruit Co., 219 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D.
Del. 1963) (interstate transaction would not have been possible but for the letter of
credit); H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 24 (In the absence of efficient overseas financ-
ing, "only heavily capitalized firms could afford to trade in world markets.").
186. See U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977); U.C.P., supra note 9, art. 3.
The prospect of inadequate performance of the underlying contract is the reason for
the wide-spread use of the letter of credit. See Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v.
Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Bank of Newport v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1572, 1577 (D.N.D. 1981),
aff'd, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 650 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, the primary
utility of the letter of credit is preserved to the extent that it is kept entirely separate
from the issuer-customer and customer-beneficiary contracts. Harfield II, supra note
36, at 241-42; see, e.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10,
15-16 (2d Cir. 1979); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp.
386, 395 (D. Md. 1982), afJ'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Colorado Nat'l Bank v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-37 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
187. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977). See supra note 168.
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procedural objection to finding the beneficiary amenable to suit in the
customer's preferred forum.""'
For example, when the beneficiary has fraudulently performed the
underlying contract and, as a result, presents fraudulent documents to
the issuer, the customer's interest, as outlined in section 5-114(2)(b) of
the UCC, renders the letter of credit proceeds directly related to the
customer's action." 9 By contrast, if the documents are forged or
fraudulent in the absence of any fraud in the underlying contract,
then the customer's interest is more attenuated and the letter of credit
proceeds may be considered unrelated to an action by the customer
against the beneficiary. 190 Thus, absent additional contacts, the cus-
188. When the right to letter of credit proceeds is controverted, "these funds
would appear to have a sufficient nexus to plaintiff's cause of action to justify their
attachment as a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction." National Am. Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1979). The reason is that when the res itself "is the subject matter or directly
related to the litigation, its presence within the state would almost invariably provide
a sufficient contact" to satisfy the requirements of International Shoe. Id. (discussing
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)). "The requirement of fair notice...
includes fair warning that a particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). By opening a bank account in another state, one may "knowingly assume some
risk that the State will exercise its power over" the res. Id. Moreover, the attachment
of a bank account completely unrelated to a suit for wrongful death has been held to
provide an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp.
1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The fact that "New York banks . . . are uniquely
qualified to service foreign depositors... may tend to support a finding of sufficient
contacts with the forum." Id. This same analysis may apply to a breach of contract
action supported by an attachment of unrelated letter of credit proceeds. See Memo
for Plaintiff at 5-12, Standard Steel & Tinplate Corp. v. Manuel Int'l D.I.S.C., Inc.,
No. 81-5118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Such application, however, would violate the substan-
tive independence principle. Nevertheless, no procedural objection is warranted
when the case is based on an exception to the independence principle. Moreover, a
"substantial contact" for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c), 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976), includes "re-
ceiv[ing] financing from a private or public lending institution located in the United
States." H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6615-16.
189. The letter of credit proceeds are related to the action under such circum-
stances irrespective of the manner in which the "fraud in the transaction" claim is
construed, see supra note 168, because a res is related to an action to the extent that
claims to the res itself are the source of the controversy. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 207 (1977). Likewise,. if the res is so related, the defendant's claim to the
proceeds would normally indicate that the defendant expected to benefit from the
protection of his interest by the laws of the state of issuance. See id. at 207-08.
190. When there is fraud in the underlying contract, generally there will also be a
fraudulent document in the beneficiary's presentment. See, e.g., Sztejn v. J. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635-36 (Sup. Ct.
1941); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 233-34, 250 S.E.2d 587,
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tomer may be able to attach the letter of credit proceeds when there is
fraud in the underlying transaction, but not when there is a forged or
fraudulent presentment absent such underlying fraud. This attach-
ment procedure, therefore, should be permitted when the customer's
suit falls under the "fraud in the transaction" exception to the inde-
pendence principle as provided in section 5-114(2) of the UCC."'1
In international transactions, the beneficiary typically enlists the
services of a local bank to confirm the letter of credit. 192 In such a
situation, the attachment maneuver may not be available to the cus-
tomer because the letter of credit proceeds no longer belong to the
beneficiary, but rather are the property of the confirming bank. 19 3
601 (1978); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-6, at 736. Conversely, the
presented documents may be forged or fraudulent absent any fraud in the underlying
contract. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp.
991, 996 (N.D. Ca. 1973); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452,
462-64, 250 N.W.2d 172, 179-80 (1977); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-
6, at 736.
191. Although the beneficiary has never been held amenable to suit in the cus-
tomer's forum based solely on the letter of credit contact, see, e.g., Standard Fittings
Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 630, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910
(1981); K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 153, 159 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893, 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), it is
arguable that these contacts are sufficient for finding in personam jurisdiction over
the beneficiary. In such ,an instance, the utility of the attachment procedure would
be limited to its security function of stopping payment to the beneficiary because it
would not be needed to secure jurisdiction over this party. See supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
192. See R. Braucher & R. Riegert, supra note 12, at 367; H. Harfield, supra note
1, at 37; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 710; see, e.g., Voest-Alpine
Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1983);
Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970);
Lustrelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 178 N.J. Super. 128, 139, 428 A.2d 518, 524 (App. Div.
1981). Because the confirming bank becomes "directly obligated on the credit... as
though it were its issuer," U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977), the beneficiary receives an
additional measure of protection by confirming the letter of credit. J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 707; 42 Fordham L. Rev. 706, 710-11 (1974); 19
Vill. L. Rev. 686, 688 (1974); see U.C.C. § 5-107 official comment 2 (1977); 52 Tex.
L. Rev. 578, 579 (1974). By contrast, an advising bank does not assume any obliga-
tion to honor the beneficiary's drafts, but merely assumes an obligation to account for
the accuracy of its own statements. U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1977). Advisory banks and
other intermediary banks, as mere conveyors of information, perform a different
function than confirming banks in the letter of credit arrangement. See id. § 5-107;
Kozolchyk I, supra note 4, at 235.
193. See Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termoteenica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F.
Supp. 510, 515-16 (E.D. Pa. 1973); UnitedBank, Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 256, 360 N.E.2d 943, 946, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1976);
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Moreover, the beneficiary's contacts with the state of issuance become
more attenuated because the confirming bank, instead of the benefi-
ciary, makes the demand on the issuer. 194 The customer, therefore,
may have to resort to the injunction remedy. This remedy is available
even if a third party makes the presentment unless this third party is
an innocent third party, such as a holder in due course ' s of the
beneficiary's draft. 196
In addition, it may be argued that the beneficiary need not avail
itself of the laws of the state of issuance because the UCC and the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Commercial Documentary
Credits (UCP) apply universally. The UCP, however, is not law; it is
merely a compilation of custom in letter of credit transactions. 197
Generally, the letter of credit transaction will not render the issuer
amenable to suit in the beneficiary's state. 19 In a typical case, there-
fore, the beneficiary may, by suing the issuer for wrongful dishonor in
the state in which the letter of credit is issued, avail itself of the
protections of the laws of that state.
Badler v. L. Gillarde Sons Co., 387 Pa. 266, 270, 127 A.2d 680, 683 (1956); Falk &
Co. v. South Tex. Cotton Oil Co., 368 Pa. 199, 206, 82 A.2d 27, 31 (1951).
194. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United Bank,
Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 256-57, 360 N.E.2d 943,
946-47, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268-69 (1976). A confirming bank acquires the rights of an
issuer. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1977).
195. A "holder in due course" is a holder that takes an instrument for value in
good faith and without notice of any defense or claim to it by another person. U.C.C.
§ 3-302 (1977).
196. When the presenter is a holder in due course, the issuer must pay even if the
documents are forged or fraudulent, or there is fraud in the transaction. U.C.C. § 5-
114(2)(a) (1977). Whether the presenter of the draft is actually a holder depends
upon the intent of the parties. Badler v. L. Gillarde Sons Co., 387 Pa. 266, 270, 127
A.2d 680, 683 (1956); see 5A Michie, supra note 1, ch. 9, § 32a. Moreover, the
presenters may have the burden of proving holder in due course status, United Bank
Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 257-58, 262-63, 360
N.E.2d 943, 947, 949-50, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269, 272-73 (1976), which may be a
difficult burden for the confirming bank because it usually is in a good position to
detect fraud or forgery. See Gillette, supra note 10, at 44-45. Professor Gillette
suggests eliminating the holder in due course status of transferee banks, because such
banks would be compelled to detect fraud or forgery if forced to bear the loss. Id.
197. See H. Harfield, supra note 1, at 225-27; Kozolchyk III, supra note 13, at 14
& n.54. The UCP generally outlines the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the
letter of credit arrangement. See U.C.P., supra note 9, arts. 15-21. By contrast,
article 5 of the UCC is a codification of pre-Code case law. United Bank, Ltd. v.
Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 258 n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947-48
n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-70 n.2 (1976); see U.C.C. § 5-101 official comment
(1977).
198. E.g., Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 880-81 (10th Cir. 1982); H.
Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir.), cert.
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As a matter of policy, the letter of credit contact alone, despite its
benefits, arguably should not render the beneficiary amenable to suit
within the customer's forum.19 9 Such a procedure may have a chilling
effect on prospective transactions.200 If merely entering the letter of
credit arrangement makes the beneficiary automatically amenable to
suit in the state of issuance, a foreign seller may be reluctant to
become a party to future letter of credit arrangements.201 This would
curtail severely the commercial usefulness and desirability of the letter
of credit. 202
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc.,
567 F.2d 554, 557-58 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 39 N.Y.2d 391, 396, 348 N.E.2d 581, 584, 384 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127 (f976)
(correspondent bank relationship alone may not form basis for long-arm jurisdic-
tion); contra Van Schaak & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145, 146-47, 538 P.2d
425, 426 (1975).
199. Certainty of payment is a crucial aspect of the letter of credit's usefulness. See
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979);
Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th
Cir. 1978); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193,
196 (S.D. Ohio 1977); cf. Associacion De Azucareros De Guatemala v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[i]n the interests of certainty and
stability" a modification of underlying agreement had no effect on letter of credit).
To the extent that holding the beneficiary amenable to suit in the customer's forum
disturbs the certainty of payment, this should be considered as a factor in the
personal jurisdiction analysis regarding the interest of the forum state in furthering
substantive social policies. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980) (substantive social policies to be considered in personal jurisdiction
analysis); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 (1978) (same).
Moreover, in appropriate cases the forum's interest extends to overseeing the disposi-
tion of the res within the state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958); Quasha
v. Shale Dev. Corp., 667 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. This chilling effect may be exacerbated due to the relative ease with which a
customer can procure an attachment of the letter of credit proceeds as opposed to an
injunction order under U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977). See infra notes 215-32 and accom-
panying text.
201. The letter of credit is established in favor of the beneficiary when the benefi-
ciary receives the letter of credit or is advised of its issuance. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(b)
(1977). As a general rule, the beneficiary, upon establishment, receives protection
against the customer's dishonesty. See 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.3, at 130; J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 706-08; McLaughlin, supra note 11, at
5. Automatic amenability to suit may engender dishonest claims by the customer,
which, when coupled with an attachment of the letter of credit proceeds, would
adversely affect the beneficiary's protective interest.
202. The prospect of foreign litigation over the letter of credit proceeds may not be
consistent with the view that the beneficiary should be the stakeholder in letter of
credit litigation. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171,
173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (beneficiary holds the stakes in letter of credit
litigation); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, § 5.52(b), at 143 (same); Weisz &
Blackman, supra note 11, at 375 (same). In turn, this prospect may disturb the
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While this policy argument has merit, limited implementation of
the attachment maneuver may minimize this chilling effect. If the
finding of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based solely on the letter of credit
contact is limited to situations of fraud in the underlying contract, a
scrupulous seller intending to perform the underlying contract in good
faith should not be deterred from entering the letter of credit arrange-
ment. 20 3 Rather, the chilling effect will deter only prospective benefi-
ciaries that intend to commit fraud in the letter of credit transac-
tion.20 4 The adoption of this proposal, therefore, may decrease the
incidence of fraud in letter of credit transactions. Moreover, such a
chilling effect on prospective beneficiaries should rarely materialize
because other contacts with the forum state sufficient to confer juris-
diction often exist in addition to those provided by the letter of credit
arrangement.2 0
5
beneficiary's interest in prompt payment against documents. See Courtaulds N. Am.,
Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805 (4th Cir. 1975) (beneficiary has
an interest in prompt payment); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (same); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National
Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 397, 146 N.E. 636, 639 (1925) (same). Nevertheless, these
fundamental principles "should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous" benefi-
ciary. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d
631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
203. Every duty governed by the UCC includes an obligation of good faith,
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977), which may not be disclaimed. Id. § 1-102(3). Thus, the
beneficiary is obligated to display "honesty in fact," id. § 1-201(19), in making its
presentment to the issuer. See id. § 5-111(1).
204. By permitting a thorough examination for fraud in the presentment, the
limited "notice" injunctions granted in cases brought after the collapse of the Shah's
regime in Iran provide an analogous effect. E.g., Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris
Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 75-76 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Stromberg-Carlson
Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Olin Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1979, at 6, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30,
1979). Like the notice injunction, the attachment remedy "may have a salutary
chilling effect on any inclination by the beneficiary to call the letter of credit without
just cause." Weisz & Blackman, supra note 11, at 365.
In addition, although the attachment maneuver may appear to impose additional
burdens, it insulates the issuer from litigation on the underlying contract and throws
the true adverse parties, the customer and the beneficiary, into court to determine
the apportionment of liability. Issuing banks, therefore, may not limit future involve-
ment in letter of credit arrangements solely on the basis of this maneuver.
205. See, e.g., Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. and
Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1981); Standard Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A.,
625 F.2d 630, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); H. Ray
Baker, Inc., v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Tampimex Oil Ltd. v. Latina Trading Corp., 558 F. Supp.
1201, 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 153,
159 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497
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B. Commercial Utility of the Attachment Maneuver
Commentators universally have criticized the attachment maneu-
ver on the grounds that permitting a breach of contract claim to stop
payment to the beneficiary is hostile to the fundamental principle of
letter of credit law.206 Indeed, this is precisely the situation the letter
of credit device seeks to avoid. 20 7 The effect of the attachment on the
issuer's near-absolute payment obligation may interfere with the ben-
eficiary's expectations without posing a direct challenge to the issuer's
obligation. 208 The issuer, however, is forced into a situation indistin-
guishable from litigation directed against itself.209
Nonetheless, the attachment maneuver does have commercial
merit. To date, commentators have criticized it solely in the context of
allegations of breach in the underlying mercantile contract.2 10 The
maneuver is useful, however, when the customer has been defrauded
by the beneficiary on the underlying contract. 21' While the customer
F. Supp. 893, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 448 F. Supp. 622, 633, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Irving Trust Co., 290
F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Sheldon Steel Corp. v. Standard Fruit Co. 219
F. Supp. 521, 526 (D. Del. 1963).
206. E.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-10, at 752-53; Justice II,
supra note 171, at 495-98; see 100 Banking L.J. 730, at 730.
207. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-10, at 753; see East Girard Sav.
Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979); Pringle-
Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir.
1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1970).
208. Justice II, supra note 171, at 495.
209. 100 Banking L.J. 730, at 730.
210. See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 1, § 18-10, at 752-53; Justice
II, supra note 171, at 495; 100 Banking L.J. 730, at 730.
211. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254,
256-57, 360 N.E.2d 943, 946, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (1976). When there is fraud in
the transaction, the customer may have a remedy at law against the beneficiary on
the underlying contract, see KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d
10, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1979); U.C.C. § 2-325 (1977); J. White & R. Summers, supra note
1, § 18-7, at 741, but this remedy may be inadequate if, for instance, the call on the
customer's funds by the issuer will render the customer insolvent. NMC Enters., Inc.
v. CBS, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427, 1429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). This
problem can be avoided by attaching the letter of credit proceeds, which freezes
payment pending the resolution of the customer's legal claim. See Lantz Int'l Corp.
v. Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A, 358 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Tueta v. Rodriguez, 176 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. App. 1965); Morgan v.
Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473, 1483 (Me. Super. Ct.
1982); Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 A.D. 525, 526, 35 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831
(1942); cf. Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 273,




may be able to sue the issuer in order to enjoin the honor of the
beneficiary's presentment, 2 2 it is preferable to allow the customer to
protect itself against this fraud by suing the beneficiary directly. The
injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only when
no alternative course of action is available. 213
Because an injunctive remedy already exists,2 1 4 the utility of the
attachment maneuver in fraud situations may be questioned. The
attachment maneuver, however, may be more readily available to the
customer than the injunction remedy. 215 The attachment proceeding
is a remedy at law, 21 6 while the injunction is equitable. 21 7 The remedy
at law should be preferred.2 1 8 Moreover, notwithstanding that the
injunction remedy is statutorily authorized, a court must still examine
factors other than those listed in the statutory provision in order for
the injunction to issue.2 1 9 Pretrial injunctive relief is an extraordinary
212. See supra note 168.
213. Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473,
1484 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982). See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
214. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1977).
215. Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473,
1484 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982) ("Where lesser remedies, such as attachment, are avail-
able to protect the interest which is asserted, such lesser remedies should be
invoked .. "). Traditionally, the New England states in particular have attach-
ment statutes that are "available for all types of legal claims and with few restric-
tions." 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 42, 64.04[3], at 64-13; see Comment, 38
Yale L.J. 376, 377 (1929). In Connecticut, for example, a creditor institutes an action
by garnishing the debtor's funds in the hands of a third party. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 52-329 (West Supp. 1984). If the debtor challenges the attachment, the attachment
is tested only to the extent of determining whether probable cause exists to sustain the
creditor's claim. Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 700
F.2d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1983); William M. Raveis & Assocs. v. Kimball, 186 Conn.
329, 334, 441 A.2d 200, 202-03 (1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-278d(a) (West
Supp. 1984).
216. See, e.g., Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira de Sisal, S.A., 450
F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972) (contract action with
attachment); Lantz Int'l Corp. v. Industria Termotecnica Campana, S.p.A., 358 F.
Supp. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (same).
217. D. Dobbs, supra note 69, § 1.1, at 3; see, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National
Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1982); Sperry Int'l
Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1982).
218. The grant of injunctive relief is "a remedy whose basis 'in the federal courts
has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies."' Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)); see, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian
Radio & Television, 691 F. 2d 1344, 1353 (l1th Cir. 1982); Interco, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1977); American Bell Int'l v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
219. Thorup, supra note 11, at 18 ("Interpretations that a more free exercise of
injunctive power is allowed under Section 5-114(2) have absolutely no case sup-
port."); see, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 586 (2d
1004 [Vol. 52
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remedy, and therefore may be invoked only after the plaintiff has
proven the prospect of immediate injury resulting in irreparable
harm.220 This requirement is particularly burdensome because courts
generally do not consider the harm to be irreparable when the pro-
spective loss is either speculative or solely financial in nature.221 More-
over, the plaintiff must show either that it is likely to prevail on the
merits22 2 or that sufficiently serious questions going to the merits exist
to make such questions a fair ground for litigation. 2 3
By contrast, the requirements of the attachment remedy are less
onerous to the plaintiff. 224 The requirements vary from state to
Cir. 1983); Warner v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1983);
Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1982);
Cappaert Enters., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 486 F. Supp. 819, 830 (E.D. La.
1980); Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473,
1477-78 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982).
220. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49,
57 (1975); Warner v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1983);
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1979).
221. E.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir.
1983); Warner v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1983);
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979); United
Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1473, 1482-83
(Me. Super. Ct. 1982).
222. E.g., Warner v. Central Trust Co., N.A., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.
1983); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1353
(l1th Cir. 1982); Interco., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 1977).
223. E.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir.
1983); Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir.
1982); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1979).
224. See Morgan v. Depositors Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1473, 1483 (Me. Super. Ct. 1982) ("A defendant's prospective ability to pay a
monetary claim is an effective bar to an injunction, but a defendant's prospective
ability to pay a monetary claim cannot even be considered in an attachment proceed-
ing.").
Article 5 was not intended to be the last word on letter of credit law. See U.C.C.
§ 5-102(3) official comment 2 (1977); see, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O v. Mercantile
Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544 F. Supp. 386, 399-400
(D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens
Nat'l . Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D. Conn. 1980). Therefore, because Rule 64
sanctions the use of state law attachment procedures in federal court, Fed. R. Civ. P.
64, this remedy should be available when appropriate in letter of credit cases because
"[t]he Code cannot be read to preclude a common law action," Girard Bank v.
Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.N.J. 1979); see U.C.C. § 1-103
(1977), and the attachment maneuver in fraud cases merely applies rules already set
out by the UCC, cf. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d at
1230-32 (applying Code rules to a situation not explicitly covered in the UCC), cert.
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state. 225 Even when the availability of the attachment remedy is re-
stricted, however, the requirements to obtain or confirm an order of
attachment may be satisified more easily than the injunction require-
ments. 226 For instance, in New York, a state noted for its strict attach-
dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank of Va., 544
F. Supp. 386, 400 (D. Md. 1982) (same), aff'd, 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983); U.C.C.
§ 5-102 official comment 2 (1977) (courts have authority to apply Code rules by
analogy).
225. 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 42, 64.04[3]; see Ala. Code §§ 6-6-30 to -
53 (1975); Alaska Stat. §§ 09.40.010-.110 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1521 to
-1538 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-101 to -411 (1962 & Supp. 1983); Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code §§ 484.010-.110 (West Supp. 1984); Colo. R. Civ. P. 102; Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §§ 52-279 to -328 (West 1960 & Supp. 1984); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 3501-
3513 (1974); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-501 to -584 (1981); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 76.01-.32
(West 1964 & Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 18-3-1 to -55 (1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§§ 651-1 to -123 (1976 & Supp. 1982); Idaho Code §§ 8-501 to -540 (1979); 1981 Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 4-101 to -228 (Smith-Hurd 1983); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-1-11
to -48 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1983); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 639.1-.70 (West 1950 & Supp.
1983); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-701 to -725 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 425.301-.316
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 3541-3545 (West 1961);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 4101-4613 (1980 & Supp. 1984); Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. §§ 3-301 to -305 (1981 & Supp. 1983); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 223,
§§ 42-133 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1983); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 600.4001-.4045 (West 1968 & Supp. 1983); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 570.01-.14 (West
1947 & Supp. 1984); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-31-1 to -11, 11-33-1 to -107 (1972 &
Supp. 1983); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 521.010-.890 (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1984); Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 27-18-101 to -1506 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1001 to -1056 (1979);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 31.010-.220 (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 511-A:1 to :10
(1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:26-1 to -16 (West 1952 & Supp. 1983); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 42-9-1 to -39 (1978); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 6201-6226 (McKinney 1980); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 1-440.1-.44 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-08.1-01 to -24 (Supp.
1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2715.01-.51 (Page Supp. 1983); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
12, §§ 1151-1244 (West 1961 & Supp. 1983); Or. Rev. Stat. § 29.115 (1981); Pa. R.
Civ. P. 1251-1292; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-5-1 to -45 (1969 & Supp. 1983); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 15-19-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 21-17A-1
to -32 (Supp. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-6-101 to -165 (1980); Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. arts. 275-302 (Vernon 1973); Utah R. Civ. P. 64C; Vt. R. Civ. P. 4.1; Va.
Code §§ 8.01-533 to -576 (1977 & Supp. 1982); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 7.12.010-
.330 (1961 & Supp. 1983); W. Va. Code §§ 38-7-1 to -46 (1966 & Supp. 1982); Wis.
Stat. Ann. §§ 266.01-.25 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984); Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-15-101 to -407
(1977).
226. The state statutes provide safeguards against abuse of the attachment remedy
by unscrupulous customers seeking to prevent payment to the beneficiary without
due cause. Initially, the customer would have to post a bond, with the amount
usually set by the court, to cover the beneficiary's damages and fees in the event the
attachment was wrongful. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-6-45 (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-1524 (1982); Colo. R. Civ. P. 102(d); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 76.12 (West Supp. 1983);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2715.044 (Page Supp. 1982). Moreover, the beneficiary may
be able to avoid the effects of the attachment either by posting a bond to release the
attached res, see, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.40.110 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
425.280 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 521.260 (Vernon 1953); N.Y. Civ.
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ment requirements,2 27 grounds for attachment exist when a plaintiff
seeks a money judgment from a foreign corporation228 or when a
defendant attempts to remove property from the state with the inten-
tion of defrauding his creditors. 229 The plaintiff also must post a bond
to secure the cost and damages incurred by the defendant in the event
of wrongful attachment. 230 The only requirement common to both the
attachment and injunction remedies is that plaintiff must show a
likelihood of success on the merits.231 Unlike the injunction require-
ments, no showing of irreparable harm is required.
232
The attachment remedy, therefore, should be available to the cus-
tomer in its suit against the beneficiary for fraud whenever the cus-
tomer is entitled to seek injunctive relief against the issuer because of
"fraud in the transaction."2 33 Such a narrow interpretation of the
attachment maneuver would assist the customer who has been de-
frauded in the underlying contract, and yet maintain the integrity of
the letter of credit device.
Prac. Law § 6222 (McKinney 1980), or by moving to discharge or dissolve the
attachment if it believes the customer's claim to be baseless, see, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-128 (1962); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 484.060 (West Supp. 1984); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 18-3-15 (1982); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 21-17A-20 (Supp. 1983); Va. Code
§ 8.01-568 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 266.18 (1971).
227. 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, supra note 42, 64.04[3] n.10; see N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law §§ 6201-6222 (McKinney 1980).
228. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 6201(1) (McKinney 1980).
229. Id. § 6201(3). The plaintiff must show by affidavit that one or more of these
statutory grounds exist. Id. § 6212(a).
230. Id. § 6212(b). The cost of this bond requirement should not be prohibitive
relative to the sums of money typically at stake in letter of credit litigation, which can
be quite substantial. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d
583, 584 (2d Cir. 1983) (over two million dollars); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1983) (4.5 million dollars); American Bell
Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (over
38 million dollars).
231. Compare National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (attachment) and William A. White & Sons v. Scott, 14
A.D.2d 307, 310, 220 N.Y.S.2d 342, 345 (1961) (same) with Warner v. Central Trust
Co., N.A., 715 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1983) (injunction). A court must give a
plaintiff seeking an attachment the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the
stated facts. National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F. Supp. at 1272;
Marklin v. Drew Properties Corp., 280 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting
Cocoline Chocolate Co. v. Hillside Enters., 45 Misc. 2d 594, 596, 257 N.Y.S.2d 444,
446 (Sup. Ct. 1965)); Swiss Bank Corp. v. Eatessami, 26 A.D.2d 287, 290, 273
N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1966).
232. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 6201-6222 (McKinney 1980).
233. The state legislatures of California and Nevada have deleted the injunction
provision of § 5-114(2) of the official text from their version of the U.C.C.. See Cal.
Com. Code § 5114(2)(b) (West 1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.5114 (1979). The





Given the versatility of the letter of credit, its use undoubtedly will
increase in the future. The letter of credit inevitably will be the
subject of increased litigation in federal courts as the parameters of its
commercial utility are realized. The independence principle, though
important to the commercial significance of the letter of credit, should
not be used to foreclose summarily and capriciously the use of the
doctrines of indispensable party, intervention, impleader and quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction in letter of credit litigation. Rather, the facts and
procedural posture of each case must be examined carefully to deter-
mine whether the implementation of these procedural devices will
lead to an expeditious resolution of the dispute and a mutually consist-
ent and equitable adjudication of the rights of all interested parties.
Such use of these devices in future letter of credit litigation will lead to
the fair resolution of multiple-party disputes and the conservation of
judicial resources.
David C. Howard
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